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GOVERNMENT AS RESCUE FINANCIER: NOT
JUST A PRIVATE LENDER
Marc J. Heimowitz* 
In recent years, U.S. government entities have become increasingly 
active as commercial participants in corporate restructurings by providing 
rescue loans when private market funding is unavailable.  Like private 
lenders, the government can effectively control the operations of distressed 
enterprises, the manner of their reorganizations, and the distribution of 
value to their existing stakeholders by positioning and conditioning these 
loans.  Unlike private, purely commercial actors who act with pecuniary 
motives, the government intervenes to force distinctly regulatory or 
political outcomes.  This article initially explores whether existing laws and 
informal restructuring standards, practices, and policies provide an 
appropriate framework to evaluate conduct of an ostensibly commercial 
government actor that in fact is not acting to maximize return on its narrow 
rescue investment.  It concludes that the insertion of non-commercial 
behavior into what typically is an economic framework creates uncertainty 
for private investors and that both investors and the government would 
benefit if restructuring outcomes were more predictable.  Without 
challenging the propriety of government policy goals, this article also 
offers simple and actionable ways to improve process predictability and 
certainty while preserving government flexibility to act as the lender of last 
resort.
* Marc Heimowitz is a member of the Advisory Board of the University of Pennsylvania 
Institute for Restructuring Studies.  This article expands on comments made at the Institute’s 
inaugural symposium on March 11, 2016, on the topic of government participation in 
resolution processes as a post-petition actor.  Mr. Heimowitz is a portfolio manager focused 
on distressed and special-situation investments, with nineteen years of investor experience 
in bankruptcy reorganizations and liquidations, out-of-court restructurings, rescue 
financings and distressed acquisitions.  Mr. Heimowitz holds a B.S. in Finance from the 
University of Florida and a J.D. from the Columbia University School of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every successful reorganization requires liquidity.  Even a patently 
balance-sheet solvent enterprise cannot reorganize unless it can pay its 
debts as they come due, together with the current costs of financial and 
operational restructuring.  In many complex restructurings there is 
immediate need to borrow substantial funds to preserve going-concern 
value or to enable an arms-length realization of value through orderly 
liquidation.  Liquidity is particularly needed when the entity being 
reorganized is a provider of credit to customers or counterparties or when 
counterparties will not do business without a clear showing of liquidity and 
evident credit quality. 
Absent unusual contractual or statutory imperatives, the general rule is 
that disinterested parties cannot be compelled to lend funds to an entity in 
exigent circumstances.  Consequently, rescue lenders must be induced to 
provide funds.  Like conventional debt, rescue loan terms will depend on 
the perceived riskiness of the new loan, the lender’s cost of capital, and the 
vigor of market competition.  However, rescue loans often are perceived to 
be extraordinarily or unusually risky, and many traditional sources of 
funding are not available to stressed or distressed companies.  Also, the 
types of lenders who provide rescue financing (other than on an asset-
backed basis) frequently have high return thresholds, and market 
competition among parties willing to price restructuring process risk is 
typically less robust than competition for regular-way lending.  
Compounding these issues, there also can be structural impediments to 
competition such as existing secured creditors who object to alternative 
sources or terms of rescue financing. 
In bankruptcy, private debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lenders who are 
not subject to material competition often have the ability to set the contours 
of a restructuring through contract.  DIP lenders may be able to force the 
sale of a company, or company assets, over creditor objection, cause a 
company to operate only in a permitted manner, and/or significantly adjust 
distribution of recovery on account of pre-existing claims and interests.  At 
the extreme, DIP lenders may have the practical ability to compel a 
particular restructuring process or specific distributional outcome by 
conditioning financial support upon debtor acceptance and court approval.  
Essentially, a distressed corporate enterprise that absolutely, positively 
must borrow funds may have little or no bargaining power when 
negotiating with a well-positioned DIP lender. 
Restructuring professionals understand and generally accept the 
proposition that when there is no better alternative even odious private 
rescue financing should be accepted on proffered terms.  Private DIP lender 
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leverage is not wholly unconstrained, however.  Codified and common law, 
coupled with informal restructuring standards, practices, and policies, have 
evolved over decades to limit economic overreach by private actors.  
Parties in interest can challenge loan terms that are not economically 
prudent or equitable, or which are not in-line with market conditions.  They 
can highlight management bias, deficient decision-making, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and poor process.  They can object to DIP lender conduct 
undertaken with improper commercial purpose.  And, in a final line of 
defense, objecting stakeholders typically are given an option to substitute 
their own funds in lieu of proffered or approved rescue financing.1
The bankruptcy process (including pre-petition negotiations in 
anticipation of bankruptcy) creates healthy tension between DIP lenders, 
stakeholders, and debtors, and focuses attention on egregious DIP lender 
demands.  In a private DIP context, both fiduciaries in control of corporate 
debtors and lenders are constrained by the prospect of reasoned judicial 
review of their conduct and in many cases by reputational risk.  All parties 
understand that there is at least a palpable chance that a judge will blue-
pencil objectionable loan terms under threat of rejection or the debtor will 
be compelled to reject financing and reevaluate the nature and scope of 
restructuring.  Disinclined debtors or objecting stakeholders may not 
always be able to block or modify an undesired private loan but 
restructuring outcomes are reasonably predictable and bounded based on 
past pattern and practice. 
In the non-corporate context, banks and thrifts are resolved in 
accordance with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”).  The FDIA 
confers extensive authority to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) to sit as conservator or receiver of an intervened bank, and to 
provide rescue funding in support of reorganization or orderly liquidation.  
The FDIA is a resolution process that practitioners and investors 
 1.   Experienced market participants will admit that the “option” to provide alternative 
financing is not always exercisable.  Even if a deal is shopped to exhaustion, allowing for a 
good faith process to raise capital and sufficient time, a stakeholder may face 
insurmountable practical hurdles to raising capital.  Disorganization, including poor 
coordination and disagreement among creditors, is a common impediment.  The proffered 
DIP lender may have an insurmountable competitive edge due to asymmetric information or 
company support.  Junior creditors may be unable to raise DIP financing on a junior lien 
basis, to win or afford to wage a priming fight, to accumulate enough capital to take out 
senior claims, or to object at all except at risk of breach of inter-creditor contract.  Some 
senior secured creditors may find themselves excluded from and futilely fighting a DIP loan 
offered by a subset of the same class.  Alternatively, the amount of rescue capital needed 
might be disproportionately large compared to the market value of the existing investment.  
Still, it is unusual for a DIP lender to provide funds substantially below market, and most 
courts likely would be hostile to a prospective DIP lender who refuses to acknowledge 
alternative terms and market conditions. 
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understand relatively well even though the statute itself allows for 
extensive exercise of FDIC discretion, minimal court supervision, and 
theoretically disparate outcomes across cases.  Investors reasonably can 
predict how banks will be resolved because the FDIC in its capacity as 
banking resolution authority follows transparent rules and regulations that 
have been applied consistently over time.  The FDIC (and the now-
abolished Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) and 
Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”)) have set common law and 
regulatory precedent through the resolution of literally thousands of banks 
and thrifts.2  In addition, investors expect that, as a class, domestic banks 
and thrifts will be subject to pervasive and industry-wide regulation, and 
the same statutory resolution regime.3
When the U.S. government4 provides rescue financing to a corporate 
enterprise, whether under the supervision of a bankruptcy court in a 
resolution proceeding modeled after the FDIA and adapted for corporate 
distress, or under imminent threat of either insolvency regime, formal legal 
rules and protocol are followed but the process is hollow and does not 
materially constrain government conduct.  The circumstances of public 
intervention and purpose of providing government-funded financing are 
grossly different from that in the private lender context.  Strict adherence to 
legalistic frameworks without adjusting for different circumstances and 
lender motives can undermine investor confidence in resolution processes 
and lead to suboptimal substantive outcomes. 
Initially, the terms and conditions of government loans at the 
magnitude and scope of too-big-to-fail or industry-wide lending programs 
 2.   The FDIC also has self-limited by regulation and conduct, and has developed a 
pattern and practice over many years.  There are FDIC rules and regulations, advisory 
opinions, statements of policy, an “FDIC Resolution Handbook,” and multiple speeches and 
press releases relating to interventions. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/index.html [https://perma.cc/48YB-KEKQ]; https://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/rules/2000-50.html [https://perma.cc/764G-SVYR] (outlining rules and 
regulations); https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/4000-50.html 
[https://perma.cc/KP76-PKUY] (displaying advisory opinions); 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-100.html [https://perma.cc/JN75-69HL]
(stating FDIC statements of policy); https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/
[https://perma.cc/7TD5-6RSR] (displaying Resolutions Handbook). 
 3.   Technically, a state chartered savings and loan association or bank may be resolved 
by the state regulatory authority but “state regulatory authorities virtually always request the 
appointment of the FDIC when a receiver is appointed.” See FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS,
CHAPTER 8: THE FDIC’S ROLE AS RECEIVER, 215, https://www.fdic.gov/ 
bank/historical/managing/history1-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HXT-VNQW]. 
 4.   Rescue financing can be provided by various federal government agencies or 
vehicles.  For purposes of this article the source of financing does not matter because 
authority to lend is presumed and inter-agency conflict is not at issue, except where 
specified.
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are invariably unconstrained by private market competition.5  The single 
most important constraint on lender behavior – market competition – is 
missing.  Moreover, the very fact of government intervention presumes the 
recipient enterprise is of sufficient size and general importance to warrant 
federal attention.  Government claims that disorderly business failure will 
lead to systemic harm, or conversely that going-concern restructuring or 
orderly liquidation is in the public interest, are all but impossible to rebut. 
In addition, a public lender may intervene with valid policy or 
political objectives that override or even contradict the normal private 
lender’s overarching goal to protect its commercial interest and maximize 
profitability.6  The baseline investor expectation is that government 
agencies will be viewed by courts, the public, and government officials, as 
justifiably entitled to condition rescue financing on public policy terms.  
The government, as a reluctant actor and repository of the public trust, 
essentially has an elbow on the scale.  Existing formal and informal 
restructuring rules are not suited to restrict government conduct in a 
meaningful way, or to ferret out ulterior policy or political motives behind 
 5.   In 2008 and 2009, when risk capital was scarce and pro-cyclically expensive, even 
small private rescue loans not at material risk of default were difficult to arrange at useful 
cost.  The amount of rescue funding the government provided during the financial crisis 
could not have been raised in private capital or bank loan markets in a similarly short time-
frame, under any market conditions. 
 6.   Entities sufficiently large or systemically important to have garnered emergency 
government support – banks and other financial institutions, mortgage guarantors, insurance 
providers, and top-tier industrial corporations – presumably were worthy of intervention 
because disorderly liquidation might have caused material disruption to the economy, 
employment, or other strategic interests. Non-commercial goals furthered by the terms and 
conditions of government support once made could include subsidization, development, 
value transfer, electoral politics, signaling policy change, or any of a myriad of other policy 
or political goals. 
  At the same time, it would be unfair to say that government lends to lose money.  
Agencies presumably will attempt to structure rescue financing to protect taxpayers from 
loss or ostensibly to earn a return commensurate with risk, however risk is perceived, 
provided the commercial goal does not conflict with an overriding policy or political goal.  
In most cases the government does not appear meaningfully motivated to initiate rescue 
financing in order to maximize profit, as would a disinterested private lender.  Although 
deliberately punitive DIP terms may have a wealth maximizing effect, profit motive may be 
incidental to policy goals (such as signaling disproportionate loss to avoid future moral 
hazard) or political goals.  However, there is a vigorous debate and extant litigation over 
whether the terms of government support for the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) have 
been amended for the purpose of seizing assets and maximizing federal revenues.  For a 
brief overview of the dispute surrounding the controversial “Net Worth Sweep” see
generally BETHANY MCLEAN, SHAKY GROUND: THE STRANGE SAGA OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE
GIANTS (2015) (noting in part that the Treasury may have changed the terms of its preferred 
stock purchase agreement with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in order to sweep profits and 
avoid debt ceiling limitations). 
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the terms and conditions of rescue financing. 
The ordinary corporate resolution process in bankruptcy is designed to 
limit commercial overreach by private lenders acting to enhance their own 
economic self-interests.  Core investor concerns about unpredictability of 
government loan terms and conditions are not rooted in voracity.  Rather, 
the risks are that the government will condition funding in ways that 
antithetically diminish estate value or change distributions to benefit a 
party other than the government as lender.  Unless it were in its own 
economic self-interest, a third-party private lender would not be expected 
to condition funds on a particular transfer of assets, liabilities, or value 
from the estate, on a change in priority of distribution, on disparate 
treatment of similarly situated stakeholders, or on a change in corporate 
governance that does not enhance value of the estate. 
Investors face additional risks when a corporate group is restructured 
or liquidated under an agency controlled resolution scheme such as Title II 
of the Dodd-Frank Act,7 rather than in bankruptcy or under threat of 
bankruptcy.  Stakeholders lack the automatic judicial venue and 
transparency afforded by a bankruptcy court under restructuring constructs 
deliberately designed to mimic the bank resolution process.  There is no 
court that entertains process or predetermination objections to loan terms 
and conditions, or notionally checks that the estate is well-served by the 
loan.  Indeed, investors do not expect terms and conditions of rescue 
financing will be subject to prior objection at all, and may not even be 
publicly known for some time. 
Worse, there is no disinterested manager or trustee in control of the 
borrower tasked with negotiating the terms and conditions of the loan 
strictly on behalf of the estate. The entity responsible for negotiating on 
behalf of the estate is a government agency appointed as conservator or 
receiver.  That government conservator or receiver may be statutorily 
tasked with goals beyond maximization of value available to stakeholders, 
equitable distribution of value, or restoration to financial solvency.  In 
addition, that government conservator or receiver may be deeply conflicted.  
In some cases the government agency placed in charge of the borrower 
actually regulates the borrowing entity and its counterparties and 
competitors.8  In all cases the government agency is part of the same 
 7.   Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5381 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank Act”). 
 8.  This is the normal dual role played by the FDIC in bank resolutions.  The courts 
and the FDIC itself recognize this duality not just in practice but in nomenclature.  See, e.g.,
Anchor Savings Bank v. U.S.A, Fed Cl. Ct. No. 95-39 C May 18, 2015, at 28 (noting that 
“[t]he FDIC plays a dual role: in its corporate capacity (“FDIC-C”), it acts as insurer, 
regulator and supervisor of FDIC insured banks. But the FDIC also acts as receiver (“FDIC-
R”) for failed national banks and federal thrifts that have been seized”). Investor acceptance 
56 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:1 
federal government that both regulates the entity and provides the 
financing, under actual common control or the appearance of common 
control.  And, compounding lack of transparency and accountability, 
statutorily-valid actions of public conservators or receivers typically are 
subject only to restricted judicial review and may be explicitly immune 
from injunctive relief. 
Given this backdrop, there is a veneer of legitimacy and fairness when 
the government, acting in a commercial capacity as rescue financier, 
conditions support on a particular restructuring process or outcome.  It is 
legally challenging (and it has been empirically unsuccessful) to argue that 
government loans should be examined differently than private DIP loans, 
despite different conditions and lender motives.  Ironically, past patterns 
and practices leave investors with a foreseeable bankruptcy process – the 
government will be able to condition its loan as desired because a private 
DIP lender presumably could do the same – but outcomes are uncertain 
because there is no way to predict how the government, as a non-economic 
actor, will exercise discretion.  Likewise, an FDIA-type resolution process 
for nonbank corporations may appear familiar but lack necessary informal 
controls, checks, and balances in a different context.  In the banking 
context there is little need for investors to be concerned about how the 
FDIC will borrow from itself,9 or for investors to expect commercial 
overreach beyond what already is understood from rules, regulations and 
precedent.  Observance of formal legal process offers a veneer of investor 
protection but no actual safeguard against commercial overreach or 
pretextual government behavior. 
Regardless of whether government actions in fact are legal (or simply 
that the government can act without meaningful opposition or judicial 
review), there is significant policy risk when the government conditions 
rescue financing as if it were a private actor.  There are principled reasons 
to self-limit government exercise of discretion.  When making rescue loans 
of this dual role when resolving banks does not mean either that investors agree that the 
practice is appropriate for resolution of nonbank corporations or that investors understand 
how a dual role would or does work in practice for a non-bank, non-insurer, or non-railroad. 
 9.   In practice, there is negligible or no negotiation over payment terms and conditions 
of funds advanced by the FDIC, in part because general creditors (and junior claims and 
interests) can only expect to receive payment if the FDIC is repaid in full. See 12 U.S.C. § 
1821(d)(11) (setting forth the order of priority for payments in receivership); see also 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(g) (providing for the subrogation of the FDIC to all depositor rights to the 
extent of payment or assumption).  The real negotiations over subsidization or support 
typically concern the economic terms of loss-sharing with a healthy acquiring bank or asset 
purchaser.  In addition, the FDIC is the only government agency expected to fund bank 
resolutions.  If self-funding is inadequate, the agency, not the bailed-out entity, is 
backstopped by the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”). 
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or enforcing contractual terms, government officials wear commercial hats 
and have commensurate commercial rights and responsibilities.  
Simultaneously, those government officials also wear regulatory hats and 
have regulatory objectives to pursue.  It is unrealistic to expect that a single 
person or agency can be so compartmentalized in thinking and behavior 
that only one hat can be worn at a time, or that government officials would 
relinquish strategic and tactical advantages that come from being able to 
switch hats, in the absence of self-imposed restrictions. 
Further, in the recent financial crisis, government actors seemed more 
willing to use commercial lending relationships in support of overtly 
regulatory or political goals, or to engage in what aptly has been described 
as “regulation by deal.”10  This practice has led to the perception among 
some investors that the government has created a backdoor through which 
opportunistic government actors can accomplish regulatory aims yet bypass 
normal rules of distribution and regulatory checks and balances.  It is costly 
and economically distortive for existing stakeholders and potential private 
investors to try to quantify the risk that the government’s non-economic 
agenda will impair their investments.  Perversely, the very goal of 
encouraging private capital ahead of the taxpayer is undermined by 
inconsistent government conduct and uncertainty over the terms and 
conditions of government lending.  Ideally for investors, public policy 
considerations (and the uncertainties they create) would be expressed 
through the political and administrative processes, including the decision to 
make the rescue loan, and not by managing the restructuring process 
through the loan. 
There has been extensive debate over whether and when the 
government should invest in a distressed enterprise, at what threshold and 
amount, and towards which purpose.  In general, there has been thoughtful 
consideration about rules to constrain the government’s decision to invest, 
rules that lower the incidence of intervention, and rules that increase the 
likelihood of successful intervention as seen from the perspective of the 
 10.   See Steven M. Davidoff and David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s 
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468 (2009) (discussing the roles 
of government as “Deal Facilitator,” “Dealmaker,” and “Deal Machine”).  From the 
government’s viewpoint, it may be rational or necessary to force existing stakeholders to 
bear the costs of providing a public good.  This can be done directly by conditioning support 
on a particular distribution of estate value, or indirectly through sale of estate assets for less 
than reasonably equivalent value or forced assumption of estate liabilities.  In addition, the 
government sometimes relinquishes recovery, forgoes return, or transfers value to non-
governmental entities.  In a free-market economy the government is not supposed to 
intervene in a commercial capacity for the purpose of aggregated wealth, but deliberately 
acting against its own narrow pecuniary interest is something no purely commercial actor 
would do. 
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national interest.  Less consideration has been paid to how specifically the 
government should set contractual terms and conditions of rescue loans, 
how it should manage investments once made, and how it should address 
conflicts of interest and matters of corporate governance.  This article 
discusses the historical context of and concerns about government rescue 
financing, and then discusses four self-imposed limits on the government’s 
ability to condition and manage rescue loans.  Compliance with these limits 
is justified even though private lending might not be similarly restricted, is 
likely to improve predictability of process and outcome, and is not unduly 
restrictive of government exercise of discretion. 
I. GOVERNMENT USE OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIPS TO ADVANCE POLICY OR POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES 
The federal government has often acted as a commercial lender or 
rescue financier in support of markets.  Controversy over the scope and 
propriety of market intervention started at least as early as the dispute over 
the First Bank congressional charter drafted in 1791 (and abandoned in 
1811).  The Federal Reserve was created in 1913.  The War Finance 
Corporation, created in 1918, provided loans to support transition to a 
peacetime economy after World War I.  The Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, created in 1932, made loans to and equity injections in 
distressed banks, as well as railroads and mortgage associations.  The 
Federal Home Loan Bank has been in business since 1932.  The FDIC has 
served a bank depositor backstop function since 1933.  Fannie Mae was 
created in 1938 to offer federal funds in support of the residential mortgage 
market, and was followed by the Government National Mortgage 
Association in 1968 and Freddie Mac in 1970.  The Student Loan 
Marketing Association purchased its first student loan in 1975.  The 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation issued its first pension check in 
1975.
Post-New Deal bail-outs of private actors ramped up in the 1970s.  
Government-funded Amtrak took over intercity rail passenger service from 
private operators in 1971,11 and Conrail was created in 1974 to take over 
 11.   Amtrak’s genesis can be traced to the failure of The Penn Central Transportation 
Company in 1970.  Penn Central filed for bankruptcy after Congress refused to provide 
financial assistance to the railroad to meet short-term commercial paper obligations.  It was 
the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history at the time of its filing, and was not 
unambiguously surpassed in size (measured by inflation-adjusted assets) by a corporate filer 
until Texaco filed for bankruptcy in 1987.  For a discussion of the circumstances 
surrounding the Penn Central bankruptcy and its effects on commercial paper markets see
generally Charles Calomiris, Is the Discount Window Necessary? A Penn-Central 
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the lines of multiple bankrupt freight carriers.  Lockheed Aircraft 
Corporation was bailed out through the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 
1971.12  Chrysler Corporation did not file for bankruptcy in 1980 but 
instead received controversial federal loan guarantees explicitly 
conditioned upon significant concessions from creditors.13  On the financial 
institution side, in 1974 Franklin National Bank received an unprecedented 
bail-out loan from the Federal Reserve in order to prevent systemic 
economic damage predicted to occur in a disorderly wind-down.14
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company failed in 1984 and 
remained the biggest bank failure in U.S. history until Washington Mutual 
failed in 2008.  (In fact, the bail-out and resolution of Continental Illinois 
gave rise to the term “too big to fail.”)15  The savings and loan crisis that 
Perspective, (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4573, 1993) (arguing 
that the principal purpose of the discount window should be to provide temporary support to 
certain financial markets during localized financial crises) and STAFF OF THE SEC TO THE 
SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL
COMPANY (Comm. Print 1972), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/house/ 
1972house_fincolpenncentral.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRP9-UFGP] (suggesting 
recommendations for the SEC to avoid financial crises brought on by large bankruptcy 
filings).
 12.   See 15 U.S.C. § 1841 (1971) (establishing an Emergency Loan Guarantee Board).  
The Act is titled as if it is a broad lending program but ended up a bespoke rescue package 
for Lockheed, which borrowed $245 million out of the $250 million facility.  See ELMER B.
STAATS, COMP. GEN., PSAD-78-66; B-169300, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY LOAN
GUARANTEE ACT (1978), http://gao.gov/assets/130/121251.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL8A-
MQ8E] (describing Lockheed Martin as the only business to apply for a guaranteed loan 
under the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971). 
 13.   See Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 
Stat. 1324 (1980) (detailing the federal loan guarantees the Chrysler Corporation received in 
1980); see also JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40005, CHRYSLER
CORPORATION LOAN GUARANTEE ACT OF 1979: BACKGROUND, PROVISIONS, AND COST
(2008), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/569/ [https://perma.cc/K69S-
U6NA] (providing information on the federal loan guarantees and creditor concessions).  
 14.    See generally JOAN E. SPERO, THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK:
CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM (1980) (describing the perceived risks 
of failure of the Franklin National Bank); see also Press Release, Federal Reserve (Oct. 8, 
1974), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/burns/burns_19741008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/344L-FDZU] (relating how the bail-out of Franklin National Bank was in 
the public interest). See also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/ 
bank/analytical/firstfifty/chapter5.html [https://perma.cc/YM7W-A49Y] (last visited Sept. 
28, 2016) for a description of the largest FDIC disbursements through 1983 (noting open 
bank assistance related to Commonwealth Bank of Detroit in 1972 and First Pennsylvania 
Bank in 1980; each bank was a relatively small institution on a national scale but had 
geographically concentrated operations that merited intervention based on public policy 
reasons).
 15.   See generally Hilary Foulkes, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: The 
Rescue of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, 1985 ANN. SURVEY OF 
AM. L. 137, 152 (1985) (describing the panic fears that prompted the U.S. to bail out banks 
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began in the mid-1980’s culminated with the failure and resolution of over 
1,000 financial institutions.16
This context and history is important because investors who claim that 
the actions of the federal government in the recent financial crisis are 
wholly without precedent overstate their case.  Plainly, government actors 
looked to historical precedent for guidance and generally attempted to 
check legal boxes when formulating their responses to the crisis.  To deny 
at least some grounding in precedent opens the door to a government retort 
that complainants are either disingenuous or lack generational experience.  
Instead, the more legitimate critique is that the financial crisis marked a 
watershed because of changes in the characteristics of bailed-out 
companies and of government exercise of discretion.  Investments in highly 
regulated or systemically important companies are suddenly and 
unexpectedly subject to unprecedented political risk. 
A. Recent bail-outs were of unprecedented size, scale and scope, 
leaving no private market alternative to government financing 
The sheer size of U.S. government commercial intervention during the 
recent crisis is staggering.  JPMorgan Chase received a $30 billion credit 
line in support of its takeover of Bear Stearns.  Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac cumulatively benefitted from extension of credit lines in excess of 
$450 billion.  American International Group (“AIG”) was bailed out twice 
by the Federal Reserve, to the collective tune of over $120 billion (against 
a $180 billion credit line).  $700 billion was available to be doled out under 
that were too large to fail); see also Renee Haltom, Failure of Continental Illinois, FED. RES.
HIST. (May 1984), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/47
[https://perma.cc/XTY5-59HJ]; Larry D. Wall, Ending Too Big to Fail; see also Lessons
from Continental Illinois, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/1604
[https://perma.cc/Y989-4WXZ] (exploring the possible effect the Dodd-Frank Act would 
have had on banks that are too big to fail).  Legislative reaction to the bail-out of 
Continental Illinois and non-impairment of general creditors illustrates just how much 
history rhymes.  Congress attempted to limit rescues of “too big to fail” banks by passing 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Public Law 102-242 
(“FDICIA”).  The law limited FDIC discretion to protect bank creditors and limited the 
Federal Reserve’s ability to lend to troubled banks.  Compare this legislative reaction to 
Title II of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 12 
U.S.C. § 5381-5394 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank”), which similarly seeks to restrict government 
capacity to act in reaction to perceived government overreach in the recent financial crisis. 
 16.   See FDIC DIV. OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES-LESSONS
FOR THE FUTURE, CHAPTER 4, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO 
BANKING (1997), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6JY9-6Y7Q] (providing an overview of this crisis and the resulting 
resolution).
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the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).  That amount does not 
include the additional $25 billion in pre-TARP low-interest loans made to 
companies in the auto industry in 2008 under the Automotive Industry 
Financing Program.  At peak, there was $1.7 trillion outstanding under the 
Federal Reserve’s liquidity facilities, in addition to TARP, FDIC and 
Federal Reserve support programs.  Across just TARP, FDIC and Federal 
Reserve support programs, Citigroup and Bank of America received federal 
bail-out support of $476 billion and $336 billion, respectively.17
Contrast the size of these financial crisis bail-outs to earlier 
interventions.  In 1970, when Penn Central defaulted on approximately 
$100 million in money market obligations, the Federal Reserve provided 
emergency reserves to commercial banks to meet redemptions.  In 2008 
inflation-adjusted dollars the amount of injected capital was $3.2 billion, 
and the congressionally rejected bail-out of Penn Central itself would have 
cost less than $2 billion.  Lockheed received $1.4 billion in 2008 inflation-
adjusted dollars.  The high-profile bail-out of Chrysler in 1980 was 
accomplished with $4 billion in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars.18
The only comparable commercial interventions in recent times related 
to the Continental Illinois bank failure and cumulative bail-outs or 
liquidations during the savings and loan crisis.  Continental Illinois 
benefitted from a $5.5 billion private standby credit line offered by a 24-
bank consortium and a $500 million private subordinated rescue loan 
underwritten by seven banks, yet still had to borrow $3.55 billion from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and $1.5 billion more from the FDIC.19
 17.   See generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 112ND CONG., THE FINAL REPORT OF THE 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL (2011) (evaluating the impact of TARP and reviewing 
other government efforts in response to the financial crisis), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg64832/pdf/CHRG-112shrg64832.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SBA9-39HP]; FINANCIAL TURMOIL TIMELINE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/global_economy/ 
Crisis_Timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NQ4-U23M] (last visited Oct. 3, 2016) 
(documenting the amounts and timing of federal funding during the recent financial crisis). 
 18.   There is a scene in the comedy spoof movie Austin Powers: International Man of 
Mystery, in which a malevolent yet bumbling villain named “Dr. Evil” evaluates blackmail 
schemes.  Dr. Evil, after having been frozen for 30 years, sinisterly declares he will demand 
a ransom of “one million dollars.”  His henchmen politely point out that things have 
changed since the 1960’s and that “a million dollars isn’t exactly a lot of money these days.”  
In retrospect, corporate bail-outs during the 1970’s and 1980’s can be viewed a lot like that 
scene – bail-outs were controversial and outsized at the time but are laughably small and 
isolated compared to bail-outs starting in 2008, even adjusted for inflation, wealth, and 
efficiencies in capital markets. AUSTIN POWERS: INTERNATIONAL MAN OF MYSTERY (1997). 
 19.   See Haltom, supra note 21, (providing a history of the credit line offered to 
Continental Illinois); see also FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC
EXPERIENCE, PART II, CH. 4, www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history2-04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QKK6-2W27] (giving a broader overview of crisis management).  The 
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Very controversially, the FDIC also lifted the $100,000 per account limit 
on deposit insurance and offered credit support to other general creditors, 
and as part of its permanent assistance package the FDIC committed to 
purchasing up to $4.5 billion in bad loans.  In the end, though, the 
government bail-out package ended up costing the FDIC less than $2.7 
billion in inflation-adjusted dollars.  The S&L crisis also could be 
described as comparable in size, cumulatively costing taxpayers around 
$200 billion in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars.  In the S&L crisis, however, 
funds were applied over a decade and related to multiple financial 
institutions which were resolved using well-established rules and 
procedures. 
B. Investors do not expect that objections to government rescue 
financing terms and conditions will be successful 
Investor expectations about resolution processes and opportunities for 
negotiation materially differ between private and public rescue loans.  In 
the private loan context, corporate resolution law and practice is designed 
to allow time for the debtor to evaluate alternatives and permit stakeholders 
to object to financing beyond the minimum necessary to stabilize the 
distressed patient or which is offered for an improper purpose.  DIP loans 
typically are approved on an interim basis, in amounts less than finally 
requested, with periods of review and opportunities to object before final 
approval.  Ideally, acceptance of proffered financing does not prejudice the 
debtor’s ability to seek or take replacement financing.  Absent contractual 
restrictions (such as a “silent” lender’s inter-creditor agreement), 
stakeholders are free to highlight structural impediments to competition 
such as an objecting secured lender, or the lack of exigent circumstances, 
or the need for more time to raise funds, all in support of objection.  
Management may be indicted as biased or controlled, or simply as having 
endorsed a deficient solicitation process.  And, although it is rare for a DIP 
loan to be rejected as an impermissible sub rosa plan of reorganization, 
judges are highly resistant to outcome-determinative DIP terms and often 
will seek to edit objectionable terms through suasion and foreshadowing. 
Investor expectations are completely different when government is 
providing rescue financing.  The major distinction is that the government 
conduct may be unreviewable or not remediable by explicit statute or on 
account of sovereign immunity.20  Even assuming judicial review and relief 
amounts are quoted in 1984-dollars.  The supposition that disorderly liquidation of 
Continental Illinois risked a systemic crisis is, at a minimum, reasonable. 
 20.   Courts routinely are divested of authority to restrain or affect actions taken by 
agencies pursuant to statute. See, e.g., The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
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is available, however, investor perception is that it is highly unlikely courts 
will reject or modify proposed emergency financing coupled with a 
credible government claim that disapproval will lead to cascading industry 
distress, widespread loss of jobs, material economic disruption, or any 
similar national policy problem.  Basically, there is little or no prospect that 
government DIP terms and conditions will change as a consequence of 
objection. 
It would take a particularly stout judge to reject government financing 
even if objectors could show a high but less-than-certain probability that a 
successful going-concern restructuring or orderly liquidation of the 
enterprise could be accomplished without accepting funds.  Companies that 
warrant government bail-outs are not likely to be allowed to liquidate in a 
disorderly manner.  Government statements about exigent circumstances 
and intimated soundness of deliberations underlying the decision to 
intervene generally are not ex ante disprovable.  Judges will find it difficult 
to credibly threaten to reject financing in order to adjust terms so long as 
the government loan looks like a private loan and does not trip any specific 
codified or common law trap. 
Categorization of court objections illustrates why investors perceive 
that government DIP terms and conditions cannot be effectively opposed.  
The most basic investor objections alleging deal overreach are that post-
petition enterprises are not being run for the benefit of those who hold 
claims or interests, and that distributions are compelled to be made in 
violation of absolute priorities because the government is using DIP 
(“EESA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5229(a) (2008) (referencing TARP); see also Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5382 (referencing judicial review of Orderly Liquidation); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) 
(referencing the anti-injunction provision in the FDIA); see also 12 U.S.C § 4617(f) 
(referencing the anti-injunction provision in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
(“HERA”)).  Indeed, the draft bail-out proposal that became EESA originally contained 
language that would have eliminated judicial review of agency actions altogether, although 
blanket immunity never made it into the final legislation.  See Text Draft Proposal for Bail-
out Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/ 
21draftcnd.html?ref=business [https://perma.cc/M5P4-2WGC] (stating that “[d]ecisions by 
the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to 
agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative 
agency”).  Also, stakeholders routinely are divested of derivative rights that otherwise could 
be the basis for standing to sue or to affect corporate governance. See, e.g., FDIA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2) (providing that a conservator and receiver succeed to all “rights, titles, 
powers and privileges of the failed institution and its directors, officers, and stockholders”); 
see also Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1) (explaining that the receiver shall succeed to 
“all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the covered financial company and its assets, and 
of any stockholder, member, officer, or director of such company”).  Often, judicial review 
of agency conduct is limited to determination of whether the Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. Ch. 7, has been violated, or if there has been a Constitutional taking.  See infra
note 34. 
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conditions or contractual consultative rights (read:  veto) to further a public 
purpose.21  Legally, these objections go absolutely nowhere because a court 
inquiry about commercial conduct begins and ends with whether the 
acceptance of terms was obtained by impermissible coercion.  A private 
DIP lender cannot be accused of coercion based on non-existent legislative, 
executive or administrative authority.  Similarly, a government lender that 
claims to wear only a commercial hat and expressly disclaims a regulatory 
role – “hey, that’s the other guy” – lacks authority and cannot be engaging 
in regulatory coercion.22
Commercial objections to government rescue financing and behavior 
tend to come in three flavors:  (i) payment terms; (ii) stakeholder 
distribution; and (iii) lack of legal authority.  All are permutations of 
objections to “regulation by deal.”23  Payment term objections include 
 21.   Government actors might credibly argue that they were required in the financial 
crisis to act commercially precisely because regulatory options were constrained.  That 
argument is in the nature of a justification or an expression of well-intentioned opportunistic 
behavior.  Government actors might also argue that the financial crisis was extraordinary 
and not precedential except in the case of a comparable systemic crisis.  That argument will 
fall on deaf ears, unless regulatory options become more available and more attractive in the 
future.  Coercive terms and opportunistic use of rescue loans will be assumed to be part of 
the playbook, unless restricted by statute, rule or regulation, or until there is evidence of 
another shift in culture. 
 22.   In fact, there can be severe actual or perceived conflicts of interest between public 
actors and stakeholders over disposition of assets, assumption of liabilities, and corporate 
governance.  For example, breaking contracts with counterparties may be genuinely 
accretive to the bankrupt estate but may be opposed by government actors because of 
cascading collateral damage to other companies.  Similarly, a sale of company assets, the 
outsourcing of jobs, or other massive operational changes may increase recovery but not be 
seen as good for the nation.  Actions that heighten market disruption might very well 
improve the chances of a successful going-concern restructuring, maximize distributable 
value, and/or be in the individual or collective interest of affected stakeholders.  In a 
nutshell, the government may see stabilization and subsidization where a stakeholder sees 
wasting of assets and improper assumption of liabilities.  To date, however, courts have 
reviewed the terms and conditions of government loans solely by examining commercial 
conduct and using a commercial coercion standard. 
 23.   Much has been written about the increasingly active participation of government in 
corporate restructurings, evolving regulatory and economic roles, and investor perceptions 
of deal overreach. See, e.g., Steven D. Solomon & David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie, 
Freddie and the Financial Crisis Aftermath, 95 B.U. L. REV. 371 (2015) (discussing how 
regulation by deal circumvented established regulatory precedents through forced 
investments and transactions); see also Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy 
Reorganization after Chrysler and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305 
(2010) (explaining ways in which courts may disadvantageously extend regulatory 
precedents set by the Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies); see also Steven M. 
Davidoff & David Zaring, supra note 16, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009) (itemizing 
transactions encouraged or taken by the government in the recent financial crisis). It is 
beyond the scope of this article to recount the circumstances of each controversial bail-out 
or to opine on the fairness of any particular transaction or government action.  With that 
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complaints that cost of funding is too high for the risk, deliberately 
confiscatory or punitive, or that the debtor recipient is not easily permitted 
to replace funding should better terms be available in the future.24
Stakeholder distribution objections can arise because of explicit terms and 
conditions of rescue financing, or as a consequence of post-petition 
government interference in corporate governance.  Distribution objections 
most directly include challenges to payment of plan value in conflict with 
corporate and capital structure priorities or government earmarking of 
consideration to a junior class not in accord with absolute priority.  They 
also indirectly include arguments that distributable value is reduced 
because of sale of assets for less than full value or imprudent assumption of 
liabilities.
On paper, it appears that courts will entertain claims of deficient 
process and commercial overreach by assuming government actors can 
exercise the same rights and control as private actors.  As it is common for 
courts to acquiesce to burdensome private loans in the absence of 
alternative financing, government payment and distribution terms 
inevitably are accepted, aside from tinkering with deadlines and notice 
provisions.  Despite some high-profile disputes over valuation of collateral 
said, it is a useful construct also to categorize government interventions based on the type of 
government support and the nature of potential investor objections.  “Open” transactions in 
the absence of formal restructuring, where the government arranges acquisitions of private 
parties or provides capital support to private parties in support of acquisitions (e.g.,
Wachovia Corp., Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Long-Term Capital Management), present 
issues of voluntariness, valuation, and unfair discrimination among stakeholders.  Pre-
restructuring capital injections (e.g., TARP) raise the same issues, along with concerns over 
pricing and repayment terms and explicit or implicit regulatory interference in corporate 
governance.  FDIC intervention (e.g., Washington Mutual Bank) comes with the risk that 
the agency will sell assets for less than reasonably equivalent value or wind-down the 
enterprise in a way that unduly prioritizes banking stability over financial creditor recovery.  
DIP or post-petition acquisition loans (e.g., Chrysler Group LLC, General Motors Co., 
Delphi Corp.) squarely pose questions about voluntariness, valuation and corporate 
governance, and whether loans can be conditioned to effect unfair discrimination or 
earmarks.  Finally, the eight-years-and-counting professed conservatorships of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac raise issues of government conflict of interest and self-dealing in 
amending the terms and conditions of rescue financing, regulatory interference in corporate 
governance, and strategic avoidance of judicial review. 
 24.   For example, testimony of government officials confirms that rescue financing 
packages provided to each of AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac deliberately were priced to 
be punitive and confiscatory.  For a summary of testimony about the allegedly punitive 
terms, see Plaintiffs’ Corrected Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact, Starr Int’l Co. v. 
United States (Mar. 2, 2015), Case 1:11-cv-00779, Document 430 at 225-229.  Testimony 
from former U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner about the financial terms exacted is clear: 
“[W]e forced losses on shareholders proportionate to the mistakes of the firm.  And we 
made it clear in the GSEs and AIG that they would be dismembered, not allowed to live on 
as independent entities with the scope and reach they had before the crisis.”  Id. at 226. 
66 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:1 
or gifting of value, stakeholders have not had meaningful success in 
adjusting explicit contractual terms that mandate sale of assets, assumption 
of liabilities, or a particular distribution of value.25  Beyond clearing a “best 
interests” hurdle and preserving liens on proceeds of asset sales,26 there is 
little expectation among investors that a bankruptcy court would 
disapprove explicit outcome-determinative financing conditions in a 
government rescue loan. 
In contrast, the third type of challenge – allegations that executive and 
independent agencies exceeded statutory authority to act – has been more 
successful.  Unfortunately, if it is posited that authority is properly 
delegated to an agency and that agency does not act in derogation of a 
specific mandate,27 the statutory objection does not actually reach the 
 25.   One example of a successful objection to government-arranged financing relates to 
the bankruptcy of Delphi Corporation.  In 2009, the debtor, General Motors and the 
Treasury’s auto task force arranged funding for a private equity firm to purchase the 
debtor’s assets, facilitating an “open” exit-financing transaction.  The secured senior 
creditors in that case successfully argued that the preferred private equity firm was receiving 
a sweetheart deal and that the sale process should be competitive and open.  Eventually, 
secured creditors were able to credit-bid for the assets.  Here, the exception proves the rule.  
Although Delphi plainly was distressed when it filed for bankruptcy in 2005, the amount of 
needed DIP financing was contextually small (approximately $4 billion) and was privately 
raised in relatively healthy credit markets.  By 2009, Delphi had survived a four-year 
bankruptcy process, implicitly negating claims of exigent circumstances, and cancellation of 
indebtedness allowed the raising of sufficient liquidity to maintain operations.  Even so, 
salaried retirees who were excluded from an implicit government bail-out of other 
pensioners brought unsuccessful complaints about discriminatory treatment. In re Delphi 
Corp., No. 05-44481(RDD), 2009 WL 2482146 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009); see also
The Delphi Pension Bail-out: Unequal Treatment of Retirees, Comm. on Oversight & 
Government Reform, 113th Cong. 1 (2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
113hhrg81743/html/CHRG-113hhrg81743.htm [https://perma.cc/WW2S-GRWV] (hearing 
whether certain classes of holders of claims or interests had been discriminated against 
during bail-out proceedings.)
26.   The only practical obstacles to bankruptcy court approval are that plan distributions 
must be at least equal to the amount that the objecting stakeholder would have received in a 
hypothetical liquidation, as estimated by the court, and that secured lenders are not 
involuntarily divested of property rights without compensation in the form of continuing 
liens and cash payments, liens on sale proceeds, or realization by such holders of the 
indubitable equivalent of such claims.  Bankr., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), (b)(2)(A) (2012).  
The ability of secured lenders to prevent a below-market sale of assets, to challenge the 
court’s estimate of collateral value, or to challenge gifting is at issue in many restructurings, 
and was particularly at issue in the bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors.  See David 
A. Skeel Jr., From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit, 24 WIDENER L.J. 121 (2015) 
(discussing how transactions engineered for Chrysler’s and General Motors’ bankruptcies 
affected the outcome of Detroit’s municipal bankruptcy).
27.   Under the non-delegation doctrine courts will consider whether there is valid 
enabling legislation that offers an “intelligible principle” to limit broad agency authority, a 
requirement that has been violated very rarely. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 
U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (giving only two examples of when the Court has found that a 
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merits of discretionary agency actions.  Instead, loan terms and conditions 
set by agency discretion will be reviewed under the highly deferential 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard.28  In addition, assuming justiciability 
and a viable claim for exceeding statutory authority, court review and relief 
for investors may be limited by statute, and if available may take too long 
to meet some investment horizons or be too expensive to obtain.29  At best, 
statute lacks an intelligible principle).  There is a stronger argument that the non-delegation 
doctrine operates as a canon of statutory construction and to constrain an agency to act in a 
manner that compares the costs and benefits of regulation. See generally C. Boyden Gray, 
The Nondelegation Canon’s Neglected History and Underestimated Legacy, 22 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 619 (2015) (stating that although the non-delegation doctrine is no longer 
used to completely strike down statutes, it may be used as a canon of statutory construction).
It is interesting to consider whether overreaching commercial (and not facially regulatory) 
activity could be constrained by the application of the non-delegation doctrine.  For 
example, could a court find that imposition of punitive terms and conditions, or adjusting 
priorities of distribution, are legislative functions and therefore limit agencies to “normal”
commercial lending relationships, to avoid constitutional problems? Cf. Nat’l Cable 
Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (limiting the definition of “fees”
that can be collected by the Federal Communications Commission to exclude fees on 
account of benefits to the public at large); Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 
666 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that delegation of legislative function to a private party is per 
se unconstitutional), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015) 
(holding that Amtrak is a governmental entity).  A governmental entity that acts as a market 
participant but with a non-commercial purpose has some attributes of a governmental entity 
and some attributes of a private party.  Regardless, it is hard to imagine any investor relying 
on the non-delegation doctrine as a serious control against commercial overreach.
 28.   The APA confers basic authority for courts to review agency actions in the absence 
of legislation specifically divesting that authority.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (stating that a 
“reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
415 (1971) (holding that even if agency actions are entitled to a presumption of regularity, 
“the generally applicable standards of § 706 require the reviewing court to engage in 
substantial inquiry”).  However, the standard of review is extremely deferential, requiring 
only that the agency articulates a “rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made” and that the court examine “whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”  
Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). See
also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (permitting deference to agency interpretation of 
its own regulations unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers 
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “[s]o long as the 
agency does not stray beyond the ambiguity in the text being interpreted, deference compels
the reviewing court to ‘decide’ that the text means what the agency says”) (emphasis in 
original); cf. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(explaining that when considering an express delegation of authority to an agency, 
“legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute”).
 29.   From an investor’s viewpoint, challenging an agency decision is an uphill battle.  
There may be a sufficient and articulated rational basis for an agency decision even if the 
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court review is slow and uncertain, and at worst, unavailable or pyrrhic.30
C. Going forward 
The legislative response to the financial crisis included significant 
restrictions on government bail-outs.  Among other things, the FDIC no 
longer can use a systemic risk exception to broadly guarantee banks or 
bank holding companies not in resolution,31 and section 13(3) loans by the 
agency also acted for a transparently improper purpose.  Even when an agency decision 
plainly is unsupportable, overturning that decision can take money, time, and expertise.  
There is a subset of investors who specialize in wagering on legal disputes, either directly 
through litigation or derivatively through an affected company.  In general, these distressed 
or special-situation investors are better equipped and more willing than regular-way 
investors to analyze and prosecute lengthy and complicated disputes, and to take affirmative 
actions to enhance idiosyncratic return on investment.  However, required return on invested 
capital for these investors typically is higher than for regular-way investors.  Accordingly, 
existing investments often reprice lower when a company becomes distressed, whether new 
money actually is raised.  For a brief discussion about why distressed investment 
opportunities exist and the different skill sets of distressed investors, see Stephen G. Moyer 
et al., A Primer on Distressed Investing: Buying Companies by Acquiring Their Debt, 24 
JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORP. FIN., 73-75 (2012).  Two excellent introductory texts that 
explore distressed investing and markets in more detail are STEPHEN G. MOYER, DISTRESSED
DEBT ANALYSIS: STRATEGIES FOR SPECULATIVE INVESTORS (2005) and STUART C. GILSON,
CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: CASE STUDIES IN BANKRUPTCIES,
BUYOUTS, AND BREAKUPS (2001).
 30.   Appeals are still pending, but it is hard to envision a more pyrrhic victory than the 
challenge to the bail-out terms for AIG, in which plaintiffs won on the issue of illegal 
exaction but received nothing in damages. See Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 
428, 436 (2015) (ruling that the Federal Reserve exceeded statutory authority when it 
injected capital into AIG but not awarding damages).  There also are multiple pending 
challenges related to amendments to the terms of the rescue financing facility provided to 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Government Takeover 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Upending Capital Markets with Lax Business and 
Constitutional Standards, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 379 (2014) (describing the lawsuits 
alleging that the government shed its obligation to junior preferred and common 
shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); see also Significant Lawsuits Concerning 
Fannie Mae & Freddy Mac Net Worth Sweep (2016), http://bankrupt.com/ 
gselitigationsummary201608.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVX2-5F7M] (listing significant 
lawsuits concerning the Net Worth Sweep and highlighting that over three years have 
passed since the first lawsuits were filed, with none yet reaching the merits of government 
conduct).  Courts may also abstain altogether from deciding disputes.  The Delaware state 
courts abstained from deciding whether the Bear Stearns share exchange agreement was 
invalid under Delaware law on what were essentially comity grounds. In re Bear Stearns 
Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 3643-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 
2008).
 31.   Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5613(a) (2010) (stating that the FDIC “may not 
exercise its authority under section 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) of this title to establish any widely 
available debt guarantee program for which section 5612 of this title would provide 
authority”).
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Federal Reserve cannot be made to insolvent institutions and are limited to 
programs of broad-based eligibility.32  Systemically important non-bank 
financial institutions are now resolved under the Orderly Liquidation 
Authority set forth in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, to avoid another 
Lehman-type failure or AIG-type bail-out.  Broadly, this legislation and 
related regulation seeks to “bail-in” existing creditors by converting debt to 
equity (or extinguishing obligations) such that the resolved enterprise is 
solvent and has reasonable capital to engage in future business.  In theory, 
bail-in reduces the chance that the government will be forced to lend to an 
insolvent enterprise. 
The gating question is whether the untested orderly liquidation path 
will be followed at all.  There are powerful incentives for regulators to 
intervene creatively to avoid receivership, or to find unusual circumstances 
that justify exceptions to prescribed procedure.  The receivership remedy 
embedded in Dodd-Frank is draconian and essentially irreversible, and 
unanticipated problems or implementation errors carry severe 
consequences.  In the end, orderly liquidation may be a nuclear option 
rarely used and circumvented in most crises by creative bail-outs or forced 
deal-making.33  It may be unpalatable to provide liquidity only to 
 32.   Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 343(3)(A), (B)(ii).  
 33.   The risk that Title II still allows for back-door bail-outs has been highlighted by 
government officials. See Charles Plosser, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Address 
at the Fourth Annual Simon N.Y.C. Conference Reform at a Crossroads: Economic 
Transformation in the Year Ahead (May 9, 2013) (transcript available at 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/speeches/plosser/2013/05-09-13_can-we-end-
too-big-to-fail [https://perma.cc/JM7J-V5F4]) (arguing that “Title II resolution is likely to 
be biased toward bail-outs,” because of the “wide range of discretionary powers” granted to 
the FDIC and the likely “excessive delay” in implementing the receivership procedure); see
also Jeffrey Lacker, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Address at Council on 
Foreign Relations: Ending ‘Too Big to Fail’ Is Going to Be Hard Work (Apr. 9, 2013) 
(transcript available at https://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/ 
president_jeff_lacker/2013/lacker_speech_20130509 [https://perma.cc/Y3YL-N2Q4]) 
(arguing that the FDIC’s considerable regulatory discretion under Title II could encourage 
creditors to believe they may continue to receive protection from losses).  There may be 
more direct ways to avoid or circumvent orderly liquidation, such as subsequent 
congressional authority to lend, acquiescence to creative lending by Treasury, or intentional 
refusal by government officials to seek appointment of the FDIC as receiver.  Specific 
restrictions on Federal Reserve lending could be circumvented by ambiguity or delay in 
determination of insolvency or by defining a broad-based program in such a way that 
eligibility is widespread but application is narrow.  Note also that in 2015, the Federal 
Reserve approved a final rule specifying procedures for emergency lending under section 
13(3).  The rule contemplates a penalty interest rate that in theory can be set by auction but 
ultimately is left to the discretion of the Federal Reserve Board. 12 C.F.R. § 201.51 (2015); 
see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 30, 2015), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20151130a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6UDC-P4SQ] (providing a description of the final rule).  Similarly, with 
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companies that are solvent and have sufficient collateral to fully secure the 
loan.  To the extent the government provides rescue financing outside of 
orderly liquidation, investors face risk that the terms and conditions of that 
financing will be ad hoc.  To the extent investors believe orderly 
liquidation is too inflexible to be implemented, the government has not 
addressed moral hazard and adverse selection. 
The second question is whether there are any effective constraints on 
the terms and conditions of liquidity-based government lending under 
orderly liquidation (or alternatives such as proposed Chapter 14 to the 
Bankruptcy Code).34  Other than a few specific limitations, such as a 
prohibition on the FDIC taking an equity interest in a covered financial 
company,35 there is little to stop the government from setting onerous terms 
and conditions for rescue funding since there is no requirement that lending 
terms be tied to risk of repayment.  Although the Orderly Liquidation Fund 
can borrow funds at a corporate index spread over treasuries,36 there is no 
restriction on the terms or conditions of loans made to the covered 
company, or more likely, on the terms or conditions for assuming or 
guaranteeing the obligations of the covered company.37  There are few 
constraints on how the FDIC funds a bridge corporation or purchaser in an 
open transaction, leaving stakeholders vulnerable to under-market 
disposition of assets or objectionable retention of liabilities.38  To the 
contrary, legislation and regulatory guidance is strongly biased in favor of 
respect to banks, the FDIC still can invoke a systemic risk exception to provide assistance to 
creditors of a bank in resolution.  It is not hard to envision a “pre-packaged” resolution 
coupled with targeted bridge bank assistance that avoids receivership of a bank holding 
company.
 34.   See generally Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014, H.R. 5421, 113th 
Cong. (2014) (proposing to amend Title 11 of the United States Code to facilitate the 
resolution of a “covered financial corporation” in bankruptcy); 160 CONG. REC. H8174-81 
(daily ed. Dec. 1, 2014) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte), 160 CONG. REC. 144, at 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2014/12/01/house-section/article/H8174-4
[https://perma.cc/NFW9-W84L] (describing the rationale and testimony in support of the 
House Bill); ANDREW CROCKETT ET AL., BANKRUPTCY NOT BAIL-OUT: A SPECIAL CHAPTER
14 (WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMIC POLICY) (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 
Hoover Institution Press) (2012) (containing multiple articles relating to modification of 
established bankruptcy process to address government bail-outs and systemic corporate 
failures).
 35.   Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5386(6) (2010).
 36.   Id. at § 5390(n)(5)(C).
 37.   Id. at § 5384(d).  Government support is likely to take the form of assumptions and 
guarantees rather than direct loans, other than emergency support to stabilize the covered 
company.  That is because the maximum obligation limitation set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 
5390(m)(6) is less likely to be reached through cumulated expected losses than by dollar-
for-dollar funding.
 38.   Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394 (2010). 
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protection of the taxpayer and least cost resolution of the covered 
company.39
The third question is whether subsidiaries deliberately not placed in 
receivership under the adopted single point of entry (“SPOE”) strategy will 
need government funding.40  Simplified, the SPOE strategy envisions that 
covered controlled groups will be organized so that all operations are 
conducted by subsidiaries under an umbrella financial-holding company.  
Each holding company ideally will issue long-term, third-party debt (i.e.,
incur obligations in a broad market where default is presumed not to pose 
systemic risk) in an amount greater than expected consolidated losses for 
its controlled group.  The basic construct of Dodd-Frank is that the FDIC, 
as receiver, steps into the shoes of prior management and the board of 
directors, and liquidates the covered holding company in an orderly 
fashion.  Operating subsidiaries are transferred to a bridge holding 
company and continue doing business in the ordinary course.  In exchange 
for the operating subsidiaries’ assets and transfer of other assets, the old 
holding company receives equity in the new bridge holding company.  
Existing holding company debt and liabilities not assumed by the bridge 
 39.   The FDIC as receiver also will have unprecedented discretion as to how creditors 
are treated in resolution, including the ability to treat similarly situated creditors 
dissimilarly. See 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (b)(4), (d)(4), (h)(5)(E). But see Resolution of 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 76614, 76622 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013) (requesting comments and noting that “[t]he 
FDIC has stated that it would not exercise its discretion to treat similarly situated creditors 
differently in a manner that would result in preferential treatment to holders of long-term 
senior debt (defined as unsecured debt with a term of longer than one year), subordinated 
debt, or equity holders”); 12 C.F.R. § 380.27 (indicating treatment of certain similarly 
situated claimants should not be preferential).  This caveat still leaves the FDIC wide 
discretion to favor short-term creditors, operating creditors, many financial counterparties, 
and labor.  Perhaps the most expansive provision allowing for preferential treatment of 
creditors is 12 U.S.C. § 5390(d)(4)(A)(1)(D)(i), which allows “additional payments or 
credit[s] additional amounts to or with respect to or for the account of any claimant or 
category of claimants of the covered financial company, if the Corporation determines that 
such payments or credits are necessary or appropriate to minimize losses to the Corporation 
as receiver from the orderly liquidation of the covered financial company under this 
section.”  One wonders whether this critical-vendor-on-steroids provision ironically could 
be used to prefer systemically important claimants over ordinary counterparties and small 
businesses, on the grounds that failure to transfer value would cause cascading disruption.
 40.   See Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point 
of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76614, 76622 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013) (containing the 
FDIC’s description of the SPOE strategy), and comments received, available at
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2013/2013-single-point-entry.html
[https://perma.cc/NP4L-JCX8].  The SPOE concept is most often discussed in the context of 
Dodd-Frank, but equally could apply to resolution under proposed Chapter 14 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, or other resolution regimes. 
72 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:1 
holding company are subject to compromise.  The operating subsidiaries 
and the new bridge holding company are solvent, in theory. 
Positing solvency does not mean either the bridge holding company or 
operating subsidiaries have sufficient liquidity to support operations.  There 
is no reason to presume that subsidiary creditors will roll short-term debt, 
that counterparties will revert to typical payment terms, or that operating 
cash flow will normalize while the holding company is in receivership.41
Indeed, the opposite may be true.  As in a bankruptcy, SPOE subsidiaries 
suffer funding infirmities such as investor differentiation and discontinuity 
of capital, asymmetric information and control, and lack of separation 
between subsidiaries and parent.  There is also a risk that, prior to 
receivership, obligations ordinarily incurred by the parent holding company 
were shifted to subsidiaries.  Not only is this a moral hazard problem, but it 
may mean that subsidiary creditors will be particularly sensitive to any risk 
of illiquidity or lack of government support for subsidiaries.  And, even if 
the SPOE construct makes it more likely that subsidiaries are solvent, 
whether the subsidiaries are insolvent or only illiquid may itself depend on 
the degree of government support. 
Pointedly, the subsidiaries of the covered holding company are not 
placed in receivership under SPOE.  Those subsidiaries generally are 
eligible to borrow as normal companies under existing government lending 
programs or undefined future government lending programs.  Investors 
perceive substantial risk that subsidiaries would be forced to accept or 
would acquiesce to noncommercial lending terms and conditions.42  In 
addition, to the extent a government agency provides financing, either 
directly or through the covered holding company, there is no requirement 
that loan terms and conditions differentiate between holding companies and 
subsidiaries, or among subsidiaries.  How these subsidiary loan facilities 
are priced and conditioned, how they are exited, and how corporate 
 41.   See John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 122 (2015) (“A recapitalized SIFI in Title II may, however, 
face a liquidity crunch even if it is fundamentally solvent.  The short-term creditors of its 
operating subsidiaries may (out of an abundance of caution due to the opacity of the SIFI’s 
true value) refuse to roll over their loans, and the SIFI may not have enough cash and liquid 
securities to pay them all back.”).  Creditors and counterparties might be more likely to roll 
debt, extend credit, and purchase product if the terms of the government’s liquidity facility 
were predictable, transparent, and purely commercial in nature.
 42.   Under Dodd-Frank, the FDIC has replaced management at the holding company.  
There is no guarantee that subsidiaries will have functioning independent management, and 
in any event subsidiaries operate under omnipresent threat of receivership and regulatory 
action. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 
5384(c)(3) (2010) (providing for consultation between the receiver and regulators); 12 
U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(E) (providing for receivership of failing subsidiaries).  Essentially, 
there may not be a fiduciary accountable to existing subsidiary stakeholders.
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governance is managed in the interim, all affect the cost of capital at the 
operating subsidiaries,43 and particularly at the residual-value holding 
company that initially issued bail-in debt. 
Prospective investors are very concerned about how the FDIC will 
exercise orderly liquidation authority under Title II of The Dodd-Frank 
Act, or how a different authority or agency will act.  The basic issue is 
whether the exercise of agency discretion can be predicted.  Superficially, it 
is understandable for Congress to delegate resolution authority to agencies 
in a manner similar to delegation of bank resolution authority under the 
FDIA.  However, there is no precedent for how the FDIC will act in its 
capacity as Title II resolution authority, nor is there transparent guidance 
about how the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, or any other authority will set 
terms and conditions of prospective rescue loans in the next crisis. 
II. PRIVATE INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE ON
PREDICTABILITY AND CERTAINTY OF PROCESS
Investors are path-dependent, and they allocate capital based on past 
practice, formal rules, and informal rules and standards.44 Ad hoc or post
hoc alteration of rights and expectations is incredibly damaging to investor 
confidence – there is little objective about green meaning “go” and red 
meaning “stop” but the rule would never be switched while driving.  
Indeed, within reason, investors who do not know in what part of the 
capital structure the next investment will be made should prefer 
predictability of process over substantive outcome, to reduce dead-weight 
loss.  Predictability is so valuable that sometimes an investment will trade 
up, not down, on news of a larger-than-expected penalty or fine because the 
gain in certainty is worth more than the extra realized loss. 
A substantively poor rule may result in risk allocations and costs of 
capital that are suboptimal for individual companies or national interests.  
 43.   Since the SPOE strategy presumes solvency at the subsidiary level, government 
lending to the controlled subsidiary group should be viewed as providing liquidity and not 
addressing balance-sheet insolvency.  Accordingly, there is a strong intellectual argument 
that a secured subsidiary liquidity facility should be relatively low-cost and transparent, with 
a predictable moral hazard premium and otherwise plain-vanilla terms, analogous to practice 
at the Federal Reserve Discount Window. 
 44.   Not all ambiguities need be resolved for informal practices and procedures to 
provide a measure of predictability for investors.  For example, the term “indubitable 
equivalent” has been tossed around in bankruptcy case law since 1935 and is expressly 
incorporated in Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Although the term has meaning only 
as applied, general agreement among practitioners about what the term should mean reduces 
uncertainty of outcome to marginal disputes. 
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The individual investor, however, will adjust the price paid for an 
investment until required return on invested capital is met, within reason.  
For example, an investor may lend money in the U.S. and in France to 
materially similar companies but at dissimilar rates that reflect differing 
priority of labor claims in bankruptcy.  Similarly, state law contractual 
priorities of distribution can be changed or even reversed through 
application of the Bankruptcy Code (e.g., elevation of unsecured claims 
into administrative claims, disallowance or limitation of otherwise 
enforceable claims, conversion of non-recourse claims into recourse, 
nonconsensual priming liens, etc.), but these exceptions are explicit, 
predictable, and can be priced.  The baseline expectation of investors is that 
net asset value will be distributed or deemed distributed in order of non-
insolvency capital priority.  The government is free to make exceptions to 
this rule of general application, but such exceptions need to be predictable 
and applied consistently to be accepted by investors. 
A. Government signaling during the recent financial crisis indicates 
greater willingness to impair private capital, and less willingness 
to distinguish illiquidity from balance-sheet insolvency 
For heavily regulated industries the political pendulum seems to be 
swinging more towards heightened regulation and protecting the taxpayer, 
and against private investor recovery.  Investors are concerned that the 
government deliberately will “bail-in” more of a capital structure than 
necessary for rehabilitation, both to show that private capital shares the risk 
of business failure and to avoid perception of a windfall arising from 
government intervention.  Many would argue there should be no 
complaining by stakeholders unless and until recovery is lower than if the 
government had not provided aid.  The unstated (and sometimes stated) 
justification is that existing stakeholders have diminished entitlement to 
value created by explicit and implicit government support and bail-out.  
The corollary view is that because the government created value in excess 
of theoretical recoveries in a disorderly liquidation it may place any 
conditions upon distribution of that excess value. 
Re-characterizing “but for” recovery as a windfall that can be re-
allocated by the government is an especially pernicious position to take 
because it is logically wrong and because it proves too much.  “But for” 
deposit insurance, many banks would be insolvent.  Many highly regulated 
companies such as insurance companies and utilities could not survive “but 
for” regulatory tolerance and market protection.  Patent-holders would not 
have value “but for” government enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.  At the most basic level, “but for” pre-petition private capital, there 
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would not be an enterprise to bail out.45
No reasonable restructuring practitioner would expect to win an 
argument that a private rescue lender equitably is entitled to all excess 
value simply because that excess value would not exist “but for” the rescue 
financing.  There is no absolute or controlling principle for determining 
how distributions in excess of disorderly liquidation should be shared 
between rescue financiers and existing stakeholders, and the value of a loan 
typically is viewed from the perspective of the debtor’s estate, not that of 
the lender.  Basically, injection of public capital by a reluctant lender of last 
resort is an extraordinary political event but is not a special case. 
Private capital investors in rescued businesses never have enjoyed 
public sympathy.  Even so, investor perception is that during the recent 
financial crisis government rescues were deliberately structured to 
designate “winners” and “losers” in a way not pervasive in the 1970s and 
80s.  To some, the government purposefully adjusted private capital 
recoveries or interfered in corporate governance to favor particular parties 
at the expense of others.46  More generally, government action in the 2008 
 45.   Putting aside that there is no objective way to allocate value among multiple “but 
for” creators of value, it can be recognized that the government has the power to create 
value, or through inaction to destroy value, without inferring a corresponding right to 
condition distribution of that value.  There are many examples where government action 
need not be taken, but, if taken, cannot be conditioned in an unfettered manner.  Few would 
support the proposition that just because the government acts as an employer it may 
condition employment on waiver of First Amendment rights. See Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) (stating that “[t]he theory that 
public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, 
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected”).  Similarly, although 
conditions placed on discretionary federal spending power are rarely invalidated, 
appropriations also are subject to “unconstitutional conditions” analysis.  In many ways, 
analysis of “regulation by deal” is just a lower-stakes (i.e., not constitutional, but policy) 
version of well-recognized unconstitutional conditions analysis. See Richard Epstein, 
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 7 (1988) (noting that “[t]he problem of unconstitutional conditions arises 
whenever a government seeks to achieve its desired result by obtaining bargained-for 
consent of the party whose conduct is to be restricted”) (emphasis in original).  
 46.   It is important to distinguish between intent to advance a policy or political goal by 
redistributing value in favor of a favored creditor class and intent to impair recoveries of 
disfavored creditors for a political purpose.  New York and Washington, D.C. may be on the 
same coast but often speak a different language, and government actors need to be careful 
not to create unintended perception that harm to any good-faith investor is purposeful and 
not incidental.  Very little scares away capital faster than undermining foundational 
principles of state corporations law and markets that similarly-situated investors are entitled 
to equal treatment and application of the rule of law.  Nor should offsetting biases be 
confused with the absence of biases.  It is cold comfort to an injured investor that some 
other investor is reaping corresponding rewards.  In addition to attempting to improve 
substantive outcomes, the prescriptions in Section IV, infra, are intended to lessen the 
appearance of bias and impropriety.
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crisis tended to be ad hoc and results-oriented, and did not always conform 
to investors’ baseline expectation that rules of general application should 
dictate which parties prevail and which lose. 
Moreover, the government’s understandable aversion to bail-out of 
private investors appears to have metastasized into a rejection of positive 
aspects of its role as liquidity provider of last resort.  The government is not 
signaling how it intends to differentiate terms and conditions of loans made 
on account of illiquidity and loans made on account of balance-sheet 
insolvency.  Instead, the government is signaling that the failure of a too-
big-to-fail corporate group is unacceptable.  Consider two companies in the 
abstract.  The first is wildly solvent, with the value of illiquid assets greatly 
exceeding near-term liabilities.  The second is wildly insolvent, with long-
term liabilities greatly exceeding asset value.  Both companies may fail, 
and each may need to borrow the same amount in order to restructure.  The 
underlying cause of failure of the first company is duration mismatch of 
assets and liabilities, and capital structure will be maintained through the 
restructuring in the ordinary course.  The underlying failure of the second 
company is balance-sheet insolvency and/or under-capitalization.  Not only 
will residual stakeholders expect to be impaired in the restructuring, but the 
cost of rescue financing is likely to be much greater than for the first 
company. 
When the government acts as a lender of last resort, it, too, needs to 
distinguish between liquidity and balance-sheet solvency in order to 
support markets and investor expectations.  The goal should be to make 
government financing distasteful enough to send a message to potential 
borrowers that such lending should be regarded only as a last resort,47 but 
not so oppressive that private markets shy away from providing capital 
based on risks of value destruction or being primed as a result of 
government intervention.  This balancing act requires price differentiation 
based on the risk of default and recovery, ranging from a plainly covered 
liquidity facility to a loan made to a net asset insolvent entity highly 
unlikely to repay. 
When the government fails to give guidance about how it intends to 
differentiate terms and conditions of rescue loans – and particularly when it 
fails to make assurances that state corporation law priorities of distribution 
and security interests will be respected – investors are left with few options 
other than to overlay a costly sovereign risk component to corporate 
 47.   To avoid moral hazard, there is a well-understood and accepted policy that terms of 
government rescue loans should be less advantageous than private capital. See WALTER
BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 197 (London: Henry 
S. King & Co. 1873) (articulating that lender-of-last-resort “loans should only be made at a 
very high rate of interest,” commonly referred to as a penalty rate). 
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recovery analysis.  This assessment of sovereign risk premium increases 
borrowing expenses for all systemically important or highly regulated 
companies, and materially increases borrowing expenses for stressed 
companies most in need of financing.  Without predictable rules, standards, 
and practices to restrict government actors, capital is more expensive, and 
at some point prohibitively so.48
B. Uncertainty also limits government flexibility to act 
The most obvious cost of ambiguity is increased risk that the to-be-
rescued entity will fail and need to be bailed out.  Lack of predictable terms 
and conditions of post-failure government intervention, coupled with 
opacity of agency processes, discourages formation of private capital.  By 
increasing the risk to private investors who inject pre-failure capital, the 
government actually decreases the probability that much smaller amounts 
of private capital, timely injected, would have prevented failure in the first 
place.
There can be a massive multiplier effect when a distressed but not-yet-
failed company receives an infusion of liquidity or capital.  Consider a 
bank in the throes of a bank run, the archetypal emergency borrower.  
Relatively small (as measured against the bank’s actual and contingent 
liabilities) injections of liquidity may kick the can until the risk of failure 
abates.  Relatively small injections of capital, whether by new money or 
conversion of debt-like instruments into equity, might entice the bank’s 
counterparties to reevaluate credit risk.  Similarly, in the corporate arena, 
liquidity can allow a balance-sheet insolvent company to survive an 
exogenous shock, and at least postpone failure.  Even for an insolvent 
company, small improvements in ability to pay and modest indications of 
market confidence, as a consequence of new capital, can start a virtuous 
cycle of working capital normalization and business stability.  Uncertainty 
about the cost of government lending and treatment of existing private 
 48.   The other distortive effect of failure to differentiate is that at-risk enterprises will 
hold more liquidity than may be optimal.  For example, a small company that can access 
bankruptcy and private capital markets optimally might hold enough liquidity to avoid 
restructuring with 95% confidence.  The consequence of being wrong is a predictable 
restructuring that respects corporate structure and capital structure priorities.  On the other 
hand, the systemically important institution that cannot access private markets faces a binary 
choice: avoid restructuring entirely or risk an unpredictable process with respect to both 
value and distribution of value.  Fear of the unknown may cause that institution to hold 
enough liquidity to avoid restructuring with 99%+ confidence.  Reducing the incidence of 
business failure by deliberately forcing companies to raise and hold perfect-storm liquidity 
comes at a steep cost, especially if creditors cannot rely solely on credit-risk analysis to 
determine out how much more to charge for junior debt than senior debt.
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capital makes it more difficult to attract new private capital to prevent 
failure, potentially in lieu of post-failure government funding. 
The other problem is that ad hoc policies make it very difficult for the 
government to provide clear signals to investors, and the need to clarify or 
change signals may actually constrain behavior.  In the most extreme case, 
ad hoc policies may force the government to change its conduct precisely 
in order to signal that prior government action will not be repeated (e.g.,
refusing to stretch legal authority to bail-out Lehman Brothers in part to 
show the government would allow a broker-dealer to fail, in light of open-
transaction assistance to save Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch).  
Government officials might prefer to rely on informal guidance, but such 
guidance typically is not legally binding, not all investors will accept 
informal guidance as credible, facts and circumstances may change, and 
intent may change.  Some investors will make unfavorable assumptions 
based on asymmetric information and the risk that government does not 
follow prior guidance.  Other investors will assume the government 
affirmatively will seek to punish disfavored private investors or companies.  
To some, government decisions made post-investment inevitably will 
appear driven by opaque policy concerns or politics in the absence of pre-
existing procedures.  Private capital from these skeptical investors may be 
either unavailable or materially more expensive than expected by the 
government.  Like the used car market, where asymmetry of information 
can mean both the buyer and seller are worse off,49 the government loses 
flexibility to communicate differing intention to make a favorable, market, 
or above-market loan. 
At first glance, strategic ambiguity appears to be a one-way option in 
favor of the government because the government controls outcome.  
However, solutions that appear to limit optionality might in fact improve 
policy flexibility and improve markets.  It is not clear that there is a net 
benefit attributable to deliberate uncertainty about terms and conditions of 
rescue financing, or about how a loan recipient will be managed, given the 
many other levers the government can use to limit moral hazard and 
 49.   See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 3 Q. J. ECON. 84, 488-500 (1970) (showing that both the buyer 
and seller can be better off when information is shared).  The government as rescue 
financier has better information than the market about what it intends to do, and further has 
the ability to change intention or behavior in secret.  This asymmetry can create problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  Even if guidance by government officials is 
straightforward, some investors will still assume that they are being sold a lemon and will 
price capital accordingly.  Other investors will assume the government will always bail-out 
their investments and will engage in risk-seeking behavior.  Market outcome can be 
improved if signaling of private government information is credible and likely to be 
followed, including setting predictable bounds on agency behavior.
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adverse selection. 
III. THE GOVERNMENT IS DIFFERENT THAN A PRIVATE
LENDER AND SHOULD BE PRESUMED TO ACT WITH
ULTERIOR MOTIVE IN AN UNCOMPETITIVE MARKET 
The government justifies its commercial behavior, in part, by arguing 
that it is just like any other commercial lender, entitled to set terms and 
conditions of rescue loans in accordance with negotiating leverage.  In 
essence, the government asks “if a hedge fund can lend on coercive terms 
why can’t we do the same?”  Suppose instead that the question is flipped 
around, and investors ask “would a hedge fund subject to the same legal 
infirmities as a government actor and acting with ulterior motives be able 
to lend on the same coercive terms?”  It is not entirely clear that a court 
would, or should, approve that hypothetical private lender’s terms.  Both 
ordinary restructuring rules and state corporations law might lead to 
disapproval, based on the status of the lender and/or ulterior motive.50
A. Restructuring rules 
The Bankruptcy Code, together with developed common law and 
practices, restricts many actions based on proposed conduct or identity 
 50.   “Ulterior motive” sounds nefarious.  The description almost always is intended as a 
pejorative.  But, in the context of evaluating the actions of an actual or proposed DIP lender, 
ulterior need not mean improper or even unobvious.  Any unstated motive other than 
protecting against capital loss or increasing return on the narrow rescue financing should be 
viewed normatively as ulterior.  A private lender that injects capital to preserve a different 
investment, or to gain ownership or control of a business, or to block investment by another, 
may be acting with an ulterior motive that is both perfectly clear and ultimately judged 
permissible.  Beyond being permissible, some rescue financings are public policy subsidies 
and welcomed by stakeholders.  If stakeholder distributions patently do not fall as a 
consequence of aid, or even better, if the rescue financing is priced and conditioned to 
enhance stakeholder recovery, an aid package should be unobjectionable to stakeholders.  In 
such circumstances, competitors, rather than stakeholders, may object to the loan as 
distortive of markets. See, e.g., GMAC Financial Services and the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program: Hearing on S. 111-462 Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 2d Sess. 
(2010) (explaining that other leasing and auto companies complained when General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. [“GMAC”] was allowed to become a bank holding company because the 
now-bank’s lower cost of funding allegedly subsidized auto sales at General Motors and 
Chrysler); The Unique Treatment of GMAC Under the TARP: Cong. Oversight Panel, March 
Oversight Report (Mar. 10, 2010) (discussing the bail-out of GMAC due to GM’s financial 
ties to the bank holding company). See also Liam Plevin & Sudeep Reddy, AIG’s Rivals 
Blame Bail-out For Tilting Insurance Game, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2009, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123776549185209083 [https://perma.cc/T8M7-4CX3] 
(noting the complaints of competing insurance companies that post-rescue AIG was able to 
offer below-market discounts on some products because of cheap cost of capital). 
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(such as being an insider).  There is a large body of codified and common 
law that restricts disguised loan-to-own facilities, roll-ups, and other DIP 
conditions intended to protect more than a lender’s narrow economic 
interest in the rescue loan.  There are also explicit and implicit limits on 
using a DIP loan to control a plan process or allocate value, including 
restrictions on forcing quick asset sales and taking liens on avoidance 
actions.51  Creditors may relinquish plan value, but in some jurisdictions, 
may not gift plan value in violation of absolute priority.  Generally, post-
petition value transfer outside of a bankruptcy plan in exchange for a plan 
vote is highly suspect and likely prohibited.52
 51.   See, e.g., In re TMT Procurement Corp.,764 F.3d 512, 521 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(discussing “fraud, collusion between the purchaser and other bidders or the trustee, or an 
attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of other bidders” as “misconduct that would 
destroy a purchaser’s good faith status”); In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania Inc., 788 F. 
2d 143 (3rd Cir. 1986) (discussing factors that would prevent a finding of good faith for a 
“loan-to-own” DIP); In re EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a 
DIP lender acted in bad faith because financing was intended for the improper purpose of 
paying creditor legal fees); In re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 B.R. 817, 824 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
2009) (setting forth nine criteria used to evaluate requests for expedited sale of estate 
assets). Compare In re Tex. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 58 B.R. 357, 358 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
1986) (holding that “neither a trustee in bankruptcy, nor a debtor-in-possession, can assign, 
sell or otherwise transfer the right to maintain a suit to avoid a preference”) with In re
Qualitech Steel Corp., 351 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2003) (allowing lien on avoidance action to 
secure DIP financing where there is benefit to the estate).  See also American Bankruptcy 
Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: 2012-2014 Final Report and 
Recommendations, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 67-87 (2015) (discussing current law 
and setting forth recommendations and findings with respect to terms and timing of 
approval of post-petition financing, liens on proceeds of avoidance actions, and a delayed 
timeframe for sale of estate assets outside of the plan process).
 52.   Gifting of recovery is an issue that comes up in many bankruptcy cases.  It is well-
understood that a consenting senior class may give up value to the proximate junior class, 
typically done to buy peace.  Not all courts agree on whether or on what terms a senior class 
may gift recovery to classes more junior than proximate over the objection of the 
intermediate class.  Some courts have taken the practical view that if intermediate classes 
are not entitled to distributional recovery then they should not be heard to complain about 
how the senior creditor spends its recovery, at least in Chapter 7 liquidation. See, e.g., In re
SPM Mfr. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1316-19 (1st Cir. 1993) (gifting by a fulcrum secured 
creditor in the context of a Chapter 7 liquidation is permissible).  Other courts take the view 
that nonconsensual gifting over the proximate class should be difficult or prohibited, as a 
violation of the absolute priority rule in Chapter 11. See, e.g., In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 
F.3d 79, 100 (2d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing SPM in the Chapter 11 context and holding that 
the absolute priority rule does not allow for “any exception for ‘gifts’”); see also In re
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2005) (gifting property to junior 
classes over objections from more senior classes violates the absolute priority rule).  Though 
different than a gifting objection, similarly situated creditors also can complain about unfair 
discrimination and disparate treatment under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b), the same Bankruptcy 
Code “cram-down” provision that establishes the absolute priority rule.  Id.  Whether 
settlement distributions inconsistent with the Code’s statutory priority scheme can be fair 
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Other parts of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules also are designed to 
expose identity-based conflicts of interest and to determine ulterior 
motives.  A creditor voting on a plan of reorganization with a motive other 
than its own self-interest may find its vote “designated” under Bankruptcy 
Code section 1126(e) and not counted.53  Insiders who make preferential 
transfers are treated adversely relative to third parties who engage in the 
exact same conduct.54  Even the seemingly pedestrian Rule 2019 statement, 
which requires greater disclosure of economic interests held by groups than 
required to show standing, is designed in part to allow the court and other 
parties to understand biases and motives.55
It is very difficult to apply these existing rules and standards to a loan 
deliberately structured by the lender to cause self-detriment and which is 
managed for a non-economic purpose.  Other than in the few cases in 
which an individual or small group acts in a particularly malicious fashion 
to destroy value, there is little opportunity for the courts to consider how a 
commercial actor might purposefully engage in non-economic behavior.  A 
private actor analogue to government lending might be a non-profit group 
that provides rescue funds to a disfavored company on excellent terms, not 
and equitable is likely to be addressed by the Supreme Court in the October 2016 term.  See
In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. accepted, Czyzewski, et al. v. 
Jevic Holding Corp. et al. (Sup. Ct. 15-649) (seeking to resolve a circuit split over the 
authority of a bankruptcy court to dispose of claims and distribute assets through a 
structured dismissal that essentially substitutes a settlement agreement for a plan of 
reorganization).
 53.   See, e.g., In re Fed. Support Co., 859 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that “each 
creditor is expected to cast his vote in accordance with his perception of his own self-
interest, but he may not act with an ulterior or coercive purpose”); In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.,
634 F.3d at 102-04 (summarizing Section 1126(e) and holding that an indirect business 
competitor could not vote its claim for the purpose of blocking any plan that did not convey 
an ownership interest in the reorganized business); see also In re Dune Deck Owners Corp., 
175 B.R. 839, 844 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing “badges of bad faith”); see also In re
Circus & Eldorado Joint Venture, No. 12-51156, (Bankr. D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2012) 
(designating votes where the creditor’s true intention was to acquire operating ownership of 
the debtor); see generally Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Voting and the Designation 
Power, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155 (2013) (describing how courts can consider motives and 
implement procedural safeguards when confronted by creditors not voting to maximize 
claim recovery in Chapter 11 filings).
 54.   See 11 U.S.C. §547(b) (extending the bankruptcy preference period from 90 days 
to one year for insiders).  Likewise, insider status can lower the burden of proof needed to 
equitably subordinate a claim under Bankruptcy Code § 510(c)(1). In re Epic Capital Corp., 
307 B.R. 767, 772 (D. Del. 2004). Moreover, insider status can be a “badge of fraud” 
supporting an inference of intent to make a fraudulent transfer. MFS/Sun Life Trust-High 
Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Servs. Co., 910 F. Supp. 913, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(finding insider status to be probative of fraudulent intent).
 55.   Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019; see also Baron & Budd, P.C. v. Unsecured Asbestos 
Claimants Comm., 321 B.R. 147, 168 (D. N.J. 2005) (holding that one purpose of the rule is 
“to root out conflicts of interest”).
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explicitly in order to loan-to-own, but with the knowledge that if it gained 
control it would shut the company down.  A superficially similar situation 
would be a union or pension fund that provides financing under the 
condition that labor contracts and pension obligations are not rejected – 
essentially a roll-up of unsecured claims – under threat of strike.  It is not 
clear whether or to what degree a court would examine ulterior motive in 
these examples if faced with a competing DIP proposal and an objection.  
However, restructuring financing offered by a private lender who acts with 
ulterior motive can be subject to increased judicial review, and 
categorically rejected by that court, the borrower, or other economic 
stakeholders. 
The other big difference is that a private lender DIP would be subject 
to market testing, a normal requirement in the bankruptcy process.56  In the 
private lender context, the failure of a full marketing process for alternative 
financing can be probative of a market view that the private DIP loan is on 
market terms and equitable.  This inference is plausible so long as the 
amount to be funded feasibly could be raised in the bank or capital markets 
and adjustments are made for structural and procedural advantages or 
disadvantages of prospective lenders.  In any particular case the inference 
may be improper but across cases errors will cancel out and on average the 
inference is sensible.  For the public lender, however, shopping the loan 
and proving lack of market alternative does nothing but check the box that 
typical process was followed, and diminishes investor confidence by 
rendering a generally effective practice perfunctory.  For particularly large 
enterprises requiring large amounts of reorganization financing, it already 
is the case that alternative financing is not available because the 
government is the only entity with the capacity to lend.57  The construct that 
 56.   See Bank of Am. Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 
434, 458 (1999) (ruling that a bankruptcy court should not approve arrangements “untested 
by competitive choice”).
 57.   In addition to exigent circumstances, scale of borrowing, and inadequate time, it 
may also be the case that the government is in a preferential position to provide financing 
and/or is discouraging private capital formation.  The experimenter affects the experiment.  
A lender who is also a regulator, or who will receive special consideration from a party that 
can affect enterprise value, is at less risk of capital loss because that lender can limit 
business risk of the borrower using regulatory power.  Conversely, a private lender risks 
destruction of value due to regulatory action.  For some businesses, the government, in its 
many forms, has authority to create or destroy enterprise value (e.g., banking, insurance or 
energy), or may even have the power directly to set market terms (e.g., utility rates, or g-
fees and loan standards for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).  It can gently or not so gently 
stamp “approved” or “rejected” on a sale transaction, or pass new legislation or regulation to 
control the business.  It is not necessary that the government intends to disadvantage private 
DIP lenders or purchasers, only that there is perceived risk.  Anyone who doubts the 
government can affect value post-deal should ask shareholders of defunct savings and loans 
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a government DIP is evaluated the same way as a private DIP is stilted 
since only the private DIP realistically is subject to market testing. 
B. State corporations law 
Similarly, state corporations law often applies different rules to 
different actors based on the same conduct.  For example, a stakeholder 
may be invested with a fiduciary duty owed to minority stakeholders as a 
consequence of exercising actual control over a corporation, or simply by 
owning too large a stake and creating a presumption of control.  The same 
related party transaction that escapes review entirely under Delaware law if 
undertaken by a small, disinterested stakeholder might be subject to a 
rigorous “entire fairness” review if undertaken by a controlling stakeholder, 
a distinction that is based on the identity and prior conduct of the actor.58  It 
is no surprise that the government routinely disclaims voting rights 
normally associated with a controlling equity interest and warrants (taken 
as a rescue consideration) to avoid designation as a controlling 
stakeholder.59
State corporations law offers other stakeholder checks and balances.  
Private lenders or borrowers are subject to suit for breach of fiduciary duty, 
breach of contract, and any other cognizable claim, under commonplace 
standards of review.  Government actors taking materially identical 
financial or commercial actions may be entitled to jurisdictional protections 
against court review (over and above the substantial statutory protections in 
favor of a government agency acting as conservator or receiver for a 
to describe the effect of reversal of acquisition accounting treatment for supervisory 
goodwill.  See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 861-65 (1996) (describing how 
government regulators changed accounting rules to the detriment of bank acquirers that 
relied on prior guidance).
 58.   See, e.g., Hamilton Partners v. Highland Capital Mgmt., No.CIV.A.  6547-VCN, 
2014 WL 1813340, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2014) (explaining that the court uses the 
standard of entire fairness, the most rigorous standard, when reviewing stockholder 
challenges to the fairness of a merger between corporations and their respective controlling 
stockholders).  Federal law makes similar distinctions based on insider status. See, e.g.,
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (setting forth the 
“short-swing profit rule” that requires insiders to forfeit profits from the purchase and sale 
of securities within a six-month period).
 59.   For a discussion about the duties of controlling shareholders under Delaware law 
and the difficulties in holding a controlling government shareholder accountable under 
Delaware law, see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government is the Controlling 
Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 409 (2010) (arguing that the 
Delaware courts should not entertain controlling shareholder disputes involving federally 
controlled Delaware corporations and that abstention better protects the State’s role in 
setting corporate law).
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borrower).60  A complainant against the government also must find a way 
around sovereign immunity, whether under the APA, Federal Tort Claims 
Acts, the Tucker Act, or otherwise.  That complainant then faces a multi-
year legal battle, only to have government conduct likely judged under a 
more deferential standard of review than conduct of a private actor.61
Moreover, if the government were just a private actor, it would be 
reasonable to expect the board of directors or management of the distressed 
corporation to negotiate on behalf of the enterprise and existing 
stakeholders.  In the public rescue context, “approval” of the board does 
nothing except add a veneer of legitimacy to government actions.62  At one 
extreme, the board may be effectively replaced by an appointed 
government official and immunized against claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty for acquiescing to appointment.63  Judicial immunity aside, there may 
be significant regulatory arm-twisting or pressure on a board or 
 60.   Review assumes in the first instance that the court is not statutorily divested of 
jurisdiction to evaluate government or debtor conduct or enjoin objectionable conduct. See
supra note 26 (discussing that courts are routinely divested of authority to restrain or affect 
actions taken by agencies pursuant to statute).
 61.   See footnote 34, supra.  For a discussion of the differing standards of review for 
evaluating regulatory takings (i.e., assuming waiver of sovereign immunity under the 
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491), see also James E. Holloway and Donald C. Guy, Weighing
the Need to Establish Regulatory Takings Doctrine to Justify Takings Standards of Review 
and Principles, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 315, (2010) (evaluating Takings 
Clause doctrine and, particularly, the fairness and justice doctrine).
 62.   In addition, extraordinary corporate transactions often need to be approved by 
shareholders, and not just agreed to by management or the board of directors (who 
theoretically can be coerced by a majority stakeholder or the government).  Shareholders 
may be able to adjust consideration paid for their stakes, provided that the manner of 
financing transaction requires shareholder approval and that shareholders retain rights to 
disapprove the proposed transaction.  To wit, common shareholders in Bear Stearns caused 
JP Morgan to raise its government-assisted acquisition bid from $2 per share to $10 per 
share by threatening not to approve required issuance of dilutive shares. See
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/business/24deal-web.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/2WGF-NMYY]; see also In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., 
supra note 36, (describing the corporation’s law dispute and requirement for issuance of 
new shares).  Shareholder control rights notionally continue to exist in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, although control rights are severely circumscribed in application. See Thomas 
G. Kelch, Shareholder Control Rights in Bankruptcy: Disassembling the Withering Mirage 
of Corporate Democracy, 52 MD. L. REV. 264 (1993) (challenging the accepted view of 
shareholder rights in Chapter 11 bankruptcies).  Under Dodd-Frank and similar restructuring 
regimes the conservator or receiver succeeds to all shareholder control rights, see supra note 
26, and there is no need even to seek consent from affected economic stakeholders.
 63.   See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(12) (2013) 
(providing protection from liability for directors who acquiesce in good faith to the 
appointment of a resolution authority, such as a conservator or receiver); see also Housing 
and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(6) (2008) (protecting directors 
under these circumstances as well); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5387(2010) (providing the same protection for directors).
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management to accept funding.64  And, even if free to act, it would be the 
rare director or manager, protected from most censure by the business 
judgment rule, who would reject government funds with alacrity and force.  
It is unrealistic for market participants to expect public funds to be declined 
by boards, whatever the terms, because the ultimate check on rescue lender 
overreach – alternative financing – is missing. 
The point of highlighting distinctions based on identity,65 and of 
illustrating judicial examination of motive and bias of a private actor, is not 
 64.   For example, some banks allegedly were strong-armed into selling senior preferred 
shares to the government in 2008.  Among other things, by accepting funds under the TARP 
Capital Purchase Program, these banks were forced to issue common stock warrants and 
became subject to restrictions on executive pay, dividends, and redemption of junior 
interests (something government agencies had difficulty accomplishing in their regulatory 
capacity).  The account of the “October meeting” at the offices of the Treasury was widely 
reported. See, e.g., Damian Paletta, Jon Hilsenrath & Deborah Solomon, At Moment of 
Truth, U.S. Forced Big Bankers to Blink, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2008, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122402486344034247 [https://perma.cc/SFN9-YY7M] 
(describing a meeting where the government offered to take a non-negotiable $125 billion 
stake in the nation’s big banks and imposed new restrictions on executive pay and dividend 
policies); see also Application Guidelines for TARP Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEPT.
OF TREASURY (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-
Programs/bank-investment-programs/cap/Documents/application-guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DK29-88SL] (setting forth the conditions with which a financial institution 
must comply in order to participate in the Treasury Capital Purchase Program, which 
include policies on executive pay and dividends). 
 65.   Restrictions on conduct based on identity or status also arise under federal antitrust 
law.  A dominant market participant – which the government plainly is in the context of 
emergency financing – may be restricted from engaging in anticompetitive behavior which a 
smaller competitor would be allowed or even encouraged to pursue.  Antitrust law is also an 
area where courts grapple with distinctions between government’s commercial activity and 
regulatory activity, in the context of evaluating the government’s market participant 
exception to state-action immunity from the antitrust laws.  See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 
341, 350-51 (1943) (distinguishing between a market participant role and a regulatory role); 
City of Lafayette v. La. P&L Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978) (holding that an antitrust 
exemption is only available with respect to conduct engaged in as an act of government by 
the State as sovereign) (Marshall, J., concurring); F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010-11 (2013) (explaining that a sub-state authority acting as a market 
participant was not entitled to state-action immunity).  Similarly, courts have developed 
standards for distinguishing between when the state is acting in a truly sovereign capacity 
and when it is acting as an ordinary commercial actor when evaluating the market 
participant exception to application of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.  See, e.g.,
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 812-13 (1976) (ruling that a state action 
that preferences in-state goods and falls within the market participant exception violates 
neither the Commerce Clause nor Equal Protection Clause); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 
429, 440 (1980) (confirming that state action as a market participant, in this case as a seller 
of goods, receives the market participant exception, and thus, its intra-state preferences do 
not violate the Commerce Clause); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 
82, 97-98 (1984) (holding that permissible state preferences under the market-participant 
doctrine are limited to the particular market in which it is acting).
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to argue a court should reject a government loan but rather to show the 
absence of ordinary checks and balances on government behavior.  Strict 
adherence to rules and tradition when evaluating the propriety of massive 
government intervention may violate the spirit of a thing by following the 
letter of it.  It would not be inequitable, and it would lessen investor 
concerns and market distortion, if the government restricted its own 
behavior to better separate its regulatory role from its commercial role.66
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS67
The four proposals set forth below aim to lower uncertainty without 
severely restricting government discretion.  They are simple and actionable.  
The first two limit market distortions by exposing government loans to 
market forces.  The third proposal addresses potential conflicts of interest 
when the government acts as regulator and financier.  The fourth proposal 
would improve transparency and accountability by restricting 
reorganization earmarks.  One characteristic shared by the first three 
proposals is that they openly acknowledge the potentially conflicting roles 
of government as commercial actor and as sovereign.  As noted throughout, 
uncertainty arises when the government’s initial involvement purports to be 
commercial but its aims are policy-based or political and play out over 
time.68  These proposals reverse the order of operation by having the 
 66.   One might question the efficacy of self-imposed restrictions, but they can be 
effective and legally binding constraints.  Agencies can self-restrict, and be bound by their 
own precedent. See Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their 
Own Laws, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-8 (1985) (discussing “regulatory estoppel” and the 
enforcement of an agency’s own rules and laws in federal court); Harold A. Krent, 
Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules and Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1187, 1212-24 (1997) (discussing judicial oversight and enforcement of 
discretionary agency rules). 
 67.   The focus here is on corporate bail-outs, and excludes consideration of banks and 
insurance companies, for two reasons.  First, there have been thousands of receiverships or 
conservatorships of failed banks and savings institutions under the control of the FDIC, the 
FSLIC, and/or the RTC.  FDIC pattern and practice is known, and the agency materially has 
self-limited its discretion through rules, regulations, and policy statements (the FSLIC 
effectively was merged with the FDIC in 1989 and the RTC was dissolved in 1995).  
Investors may not always like how banks and thrifts are resolved but the risk that the FDIC 
will transfer or liquidate assets at less than reasonably equivalent value is estimable.  
Second, insurance companies are state chartered.  Despite model laws promulgated by the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, each state has a different regulatory and 
resolution regime, in practice if not always by statute.  Also, for both banks and insurance 
companies, the primary expected source for emergency liquidity is pre-established 
government funds and credit lines and not private financing. 
 68.   Here, it is argued that government should not act with the same rights and 
perspective as a private lender when providing and setting the terms of post-petition 
financing.  Ironically, when the government injects capital as a pre-petition investor – 
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government enter the market to advance its policy or political aims but then 
pivot to a role more closely resembling a commercial actor. 
A. Proposal 1: Funded loans and unfunded lines of credit should be 
market tested on a vertical slice basis and be offered for public 
sale
Non-governmental actors cannot provide rescue funding in the same 
size and in the same time frame as the government.  Distressed companies 
or industries worthy of official intervention typically require massive 
injections of funds well beyond the ordinary capacity of private actors in 
risk markets.  There rarely is time to develop robust private bank and 
capital lender syndicates.  There often are structural impediments to raising 
capital, seemingly mundane but serious (such as the potential absence of 
capital market participants willing to accept private information and 
therefore be restricted from trading).  Private market tolerance for risk also 
is pro-cyclical, whereas rescue financing typically needs to be counter-
cyclical to market or industry conditions. 
Simply, the slope of the supply curve for massive rescue financing is 
nearly vertical at needed quantities in the short-term.  Without reaching the 
question of whether there is any price for funds at which the market will 
clear, it can be stated with confidence that in many cases the clearing price 
for private capital will be too high to be useful as rescue financing.  That 
leaves policymakers who wish to price government loans on “market 
terms” in a bit of a conundrum.  Comparable private pricing for a loan of 
the same size does not exist.  Alternatively, pricing could be determined by 
formula, based on risk of default, recovery, and estimated risk premium.  
This method offers false precision because inputs, particularly estimates of 
appropriate risk premium, are highly subjective.69  Both approaches can be 
distinguished from when the government intentionally provides a market distortive subsidy 
– the major risk is that the government may not act enough like a private actor.  When the 
state intends to act in an entrepreneurial fashion, with expectations of return on investment, 
it should avoid picking winners and losers and creating market distortions.  So, for example, 
a state-owned pension fund in theory should be mercenary in outlook, insulated from 
political influence.  Even deliberately subsidized entities, such as the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation or the Export-Import Bank of the United States, should maximize 
returns subject to the confines of their investment criteria.  Of course, if the government 
directly wants to subsidize a business or industry it is free to do so, and to lose money doing 
it.  For a discussion about state entrepreneurism and some prescriptive suggestions for 
reducing market distortions, see Benjamin Templin, The Government Shareholder: 
Regulating Public Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127 (2010) 
(discussing state entrepreneurism and some prescriptive suggestions for reducing market 
distortions).
 69.   In the ordinary course, it may be effective to estimate risk by modeling cash flows 
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combined into a third amalgam, where policymakers simply punt and leave 
market terms to be defined by the parties, perhaps in “consultation” with 
the Federal Reserve or similar economic bodies, without setting standards 
for evaluation or review.  In practice, any level ranging from just over 
investment-grade pricing to oppressively high could be justified as 
“market.” 
Basically, there is no empirical method to verify that the government 
is providing financing on non-coercive terms commensurate with credit 
risk.  So, why not lop off zeros instead and price the loan as if it were a size 
that could be raised in private markets?  It would not be difficult to 
estimate a loan size that is generically market equivalent to “very large but 
possible,” and the consequences of estimation error are not great (e.g., the 
pricing on a $3 billion DIP facility should be relatively close to the pricing 
on a $4 billion DIP facility).70  Any risk premium associated with greater 
size would be ignored.  The government would still be free to charge an 
explicit “moral hazard” premium over and above the market base rate.71
and discount rates, and by surveying comparable companies.  These methods fail miserably 
in times of distress for systemically important companies.  A modeler’s cash flow 
assumptions will self-referentially depend on whether aid is provided, how much, and for 
what purpose.  The types of businesses that receive government support tend to be highly 
regulated or have operations that depend on good government relations.  A private lender 
reasonably might see and price risk that the government, in its administrative capacity, will 
act in a way that impairs enterprise value needed to repay a private loan.  Conversely, a 
government lender might reasonably assume policymakers (including in some cases the 
same regulatory agency making the loan) would stop short of value-destroying regulation 
that would unduly impair the government loan.  During market dislocation private risk 
capital in small size will be unusually expensive and in large size unavailable, leaving 
discount rate and cost of capital modeling assumptions constrained only by a red-faced test.  
There rarely are enough data points to justify a comparable company analysis and, when 
there are, the controversy typically is whether a bail-out recipient is being subsidized or 
penalized against its peers.  In any event, because the government either provides 
emergency aid in a size not viably raised in private bank or capital markets, or as part of a 
cross-industry lending program that no private actor can be expected to fund, there is no 
way other than through testimony to object to the government loan. 
 70.   By analogy, a $10 billion appeals bond might be priceless at the same time a $10 
million appeals bond is readily available at a competitive market price.  In 1987, Texaco 
Inc. was unable to meet a $10 billion supersedeas bond requirement to continue its appeal of 
an antitrust verdict entered in favor of the Pennzoil Company.  Texaco argued requiring a 
bond of that size was fundamentally unfair and violated due process because sufficient 
bonding capacity did not exist. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (noting Texaco’s argument that it could not possibly post the mandatory bond 
given its estimate that “world-wide surety bond capacity ranges from $1 billion to $1.5 
billion under the best possible circumstances”), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).  Ultimately, 
Texaco was forced to file for bankruptcy in order to continue its appeal.
 71.   There is no conflict with the classic principle that lender-of-last-resort loans should 
be made at a penalty rate, only the argument that lending should be made at a base market 
rate plus a deliberate, measured, and (optimally) predictable a priori penalty premium.  It 
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This change in mindset, which takes squishy issues like fairness and 
wealth-maximization off the table, allows for a host of positive changes in 
government entry and exit strategies.  First, entry pricing would be less 
subjective.  Authority could be delegated to regulators and technical 
experts with greater confidence that loans are on market terms because 
market is redefined to be less ambiguous.  Market participants would be 
more likely to accept pricing as reflective of market conditions.  Overall, 
cost of funding is more predictable for both government and investors.  
From the government’s perspective, optionality is lost but so is the need to 
calibrate or defend terms in light of political pressure or based on the 
perceived merit of the recipient. 
Second, change in mindset allows the government flexibility to craft 
funding solutions that lie between providing 100% of rescue funding or 
none at all.  Every sale or participation of the rescue loan becomes 
perfectly commercial; that is, government actors should always be pleased 
or at least economically indifferent to laying-off risk at cost.  Suppose that 
a vertical slice of funded loans, unfunded lines of credit, and attendant 
equity consideration were available for sale or participation at par to private 
actors, for a reasonable time or continuously.  It could mean the financing 
arrangement would be tested by competitive choice, if not immediately at 
inception then reasonably thereafter.  The government would either reduce 
the size of its underwriting commitment at the outset, or divest some or all 
of its commitment over time.  In addition, the government could realize 
value from a sale of the strip, which might be more liquid and valuable than 
each of the investment tranches sold separately. 
There have been some recent attempts to match public rescue dollars 
with private market capital, notably the Public-Private Investment Program 
(“PPIP”) in 2009.72  A simple and consistent approach that allows private 
should not be an amalgamated rate that fails to distinguish risk from penalty.  The Federal 
Reserve engages in predictable penalty cost “discount window” lending precisely to address 
temporary problems banks and other depository institutions may have in obtaining private 
funding. See Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FED. RES. SYS. (Feb. 12, 2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ 
bst_lendingdepository.htm [https://perma.cc/23VQ-TXVE] (explaining why the Federal 
Reserve has a discount window and illustrating how to set predictable costs for liquidity 
financing).
 72.   It is hard to say whether PPIP was successful or not.  On the one hand, the 
government did not raise nearly the amount of private capital initially contemplated.  At 
inception, Treasury allocated $75 billion to $100 billion in TARP funds to the program, to 
be matched by an equivalent amount of new private equity capital.  Despite generous 
subsidies to private investors in the form of non-recourse loans, the program was scaled 
back and raised only $7.5 billion in private capital, not nearly enough to be deemed material 
when compared with the amount of “toxic” assets on bank balance sheets. See U.S. DEPT.
OF TREAS., TREASURY DEPARTMENT RELEASES DETAILS ON PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
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investment alongside the government on parallel terms might raise material 
private capital in some cases, and even a non-material but competitive 
private investment could be used to set market terms.  Even if the entire 
construct turns out to be a mostly intellectual exercise and private 
investment is de minimis, the practice of excluding inordinate size from 
“market terms” would introduce objectivity in setting a market base rate 
upon which the government could overlay a fixed “moral hazard” 
premium. 
B. Proposal 2: All funded debt should be pre-payable, all credit lines 
should be cancelable, and if practicable, delivered proceeds should 
be callable for a reasonable period of time 
There are two cogent objections to allowing unwind of rescue 
financing.  First, there is a financial cost.  Portfolio managers should expect 
to have winning and losing investments.  To not put too fine a point on it, 
winners are expected to pay for losers and the remainder should provide a 
positive return over cost of capital.  Part of return is realizing on the upside 
of investments.  That is why callable instruments price at a discount to non-
callable instruments.  If an investor allows winners to be called-away then 
aggregate returns on investment will be lower than initially expected.
However, the government is not a private lender and presumably acts 
to stabilize markets and not to maximize wealth.  All else equal, 
government should seek to socialize rescue costs rather than surcharge one 
bail-out recipient to pay for the costs of an unrelated bail-out.  Moreover, 
the government’s cost of capital is very low, and market risk rates should, 
INVESTMENT PROGRAM (2009), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg65.aspx [https://perma.cc/J83U-CVDP] (announcing initial governmental 
contributions of TARP fund to PPIP); see also U.S. DEPT. OF TREAS., LEGACY SECURITIES
PUBLIC-PRIVATE INVESTMENT PROGRAM (2013),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/ 
External%20Report%2013%20-9%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR4F-HWDC] (charting 
the underperformance of PPIP).  On the other hand, the program was profitable for both 
private investors and the government, and there is a case to be made that PPIP was scaled 
back because banks were able to raise capital without selling portfolios to the program and 
because investors were reluctant to participate in PPIP based on addressable political 
concerns rather than financial risk-versus-reward concerns. See Fannie Chen, Structuring
Public-Private Partnerships: Implications from the “Public-Private Investment Program for 
Legacy Securities”, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 509, 530 (2013) (outlining several 
counterarguments to the position that PPIP’s underperformance was due to financial risk-
versus-reward concerns, including the political risk concern of private partners).  In theory, 
it should be easier to raise private funds to purchase top-of-the-capital-stack loans.  This is 
particularly so if a sale program were properly constructed to adjust for political risk and 
compensate for government control over minority investors, and a familiar pricing 
mechanism such as Dutch auction were used.
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in theory, allow for positive returns on capital even if average returns 
slightly lag.  This is particularly true if a rescue loan is provided for 
liquidity in a lender of last resort capacity rather than on account of 
balance-sheet insolvency.  Overall, it should be possible to adjust loan 
terms to account for the costs of writing a call or to calibrate the call option 
so that government returns are reasonable and reflect market conditions for 
callable debt. 
Second, allowing a quick unwind of rescue financing also poses a 
moral hazard problem.  There would be less reluctance to borrow money if 
funds could be accepted on onerous terms and then repaid without penalty 
when private markets reopen.  In addition, there would be incentives to 
create value for junior classes using the rescue financing (“other people’s 
money”), which is not just a game theory problem but also a potential 
political problem.  There is no way around moral hazard.  It can be limited 
through regulation, incentives and penalties, and upfront underwriting 
charges (there also would be no assurance that the government would 
provide funding in the first instance), but the risk is persistent. 
However, dealing with moral hazard is a balancing act.73  Conditions 
for borrowing can be set to severely impair existing creditors and interests 
but, if value destruction is viewed as excessive by the market, then private 
capital for other companies will be more expensive or unavailable.  
 73.   The debate over how to balance moral hazard with fairness and efficiency is an old 
one.  The restructuring process itself creates moral hazard by allowing a debtor, among 
other things, to create involuntary liquidity.  Restructuring laws, including the Bankruptcy 
Code and similar statutes governing bank and insurance company resolution, create liquidity 
by deferring or eliminating cash payment due dates, and by preserving and recovering 
company assets that can be used to generate cash inflows.  Various sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code are designed to create liquidity even without new financing.  See, e.g., 11 
U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (imposing an automatic stay on collection efforts); 11 U.S.C. § 363 
(2012) (permitting sale of assets “free and clear” of encumbrances); 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012) 
(allowing rejection of executory contracts and leases); 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-548 (authorizing 
avoidance of preferential and fraudulent transfers of property or incurrences of obligation, 
including avoidance of liens); 11 U.S.C. § 550 (providing for recovery of already transferred 
property).  The Bankruptcy Code also encourages new lenders and business counterparties 
to provide incremental liquidity.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 364 (authorizing new credit secured 
by a priming lien); 11 U.S.C. §§ 503 & 507 (conferring administrative expense priority to 
claims on account of extension of post-petition credit by vendors and other counterparties).  
The same is true for banks and insurance companies.  Banks and insurance companies are 
highly regulated entities resolved differently than corporate debtors, with regulatory 
emphasis on protection of depositors, insureds, and counterparties.  Notwithstanding, these 
resolution regimes use conceptually similar provisions to provide liquidity indirectly 
through preservation of assets or avoidance of obligations, and allow for additional liquidity 
by indemnifying post-intervention creditors and purchasers of assets.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 
1811 (2015) (creating the FDIC); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7401 (McKinney 2015) (governing 
rehabilitation, liquidation, conservation and dissolution of insurers at the state level in New 
York).
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Similarly, there is a hidden cost when government financing is not 
repayable, whether financing legally is non-call or as a practical matter 
cannot be repaid without government consent.  Private lenders are less 
willing to provide pre-petition emergency financing if a subsequent 
government loan might irrevocably impair recovery.  Also, private actors 
have less incentive to arrange post-petition replacement financing because 
there is no contractual right to take out the government lender.  
Fundamentally, the balancing act comes down to the character of 
government as a lender of last resort.  If the goal of intervention is 
stabilization, and to allow markets time to create alternative sources of 
liquidity, unwinding rescue financing is not a public nuisance.  At least in 
the abstract it is hard to argue against repayment with private funding as an 
aspirational goal.74
As a discussion piece (no size fits all), suppose that a government loan 
can be unwound for 12 months after lending, and that at any time, funded 
debt can be repaid and the loan facility cancelled.  Would there truly be 
harm if existing lenders or an alternative private syndicate were able to 
substitute in whole or in part for the government?  The government would 
recover par plus on its funded investment, and would be off the hook to the 
extent the facility is replaced and commitment reduced.  If the government 
received non-cash proceeds as a facility fee (e.g., common stock or 
warrants), then those proceeds would be callable at a market price set when 
the loan was made.  If the government still holds the proceeds then they 
would be called, and if proceeds were delivered away in the interim then a 
call is impractical.  Such a repayment option, or any variant thereof, would 
act as a procedural safety valve.  If the government is using contract 
leverage to influence corporate governance or the restructuring process, 
then one of the easiest ways to address conflict of interest is to take out the 
financing.75
 74.   Apart from there being better uses of taxpayer resources than funding enterprises 
able to fund elsewhere, consider also that government may have a policy interest in creating 
lending programs that are both palatable and available to relatively healthy institutions, so as 
not to stigmatize recipients.  Forcing an institution to take government funds on unrepayable 
terms may signal just the sort of non-temporary distress that causes private capital to run.
 75.   Banks technically were permitted to repay loans offered through the TARP Capital 
Purchase Plan but repayment initially was discouraged by contract (by prohibition on 
repayment other than through a qualified equity offering) and subsequently by the 
requirement that banking regulators specifically approve repayment.  The paradigmatic 
example of an unpayable loan is the facility offered to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The 
government has taken the position that neither company may repay its loans despite having 
repaid in “dividends” more than was actually borrowed from the government, and despite 
alleged feasibility of raising sufficient private funds. See merits briefing submitted in Perry 
Capital, LLC, et al. v. Lew, DC Appeals Court 14-5243 (on appeal from Perry Capital, LLC, 
et al. v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208 (D.D.C. 2014)) (stating “[a]nd, even though the 
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C. Proposal 3: The government should assign an impartial investment 
manager to make commercial decisions with respect to each rescue 
financing
This proposal addresses the “two-hat” conflict of interest problem 
directly.  With respect to rescue financings, each government agency or 
organization should be required to designate a commercial manager 
primarily responsible for taking the lead in commercial discussions, 
reasonably defined.  The commercial manager would not directly supervise 
or regulate entities associated with the specific financing transaction, and 
would wear only a commercial hat.76  The commercial manager would have 
authority to make decisions related to the terms and conditions of lending, 
subject to policy or political override by the agency.  Authority would not 
be limited to monitoring conditions and participating in the deliberative 
process. 
Instead, business decisions by the commercial manager would stand 
unless overruled by the agency.  Deliberative process unambiguously 
would allow for overruling the commercial manager or adjusting outcomes 
on otherwise valid policy or political grounds.  However, overruling a 
decision would reflect a conscious choice to wear a regulatory hat, 
documented and reviewable as regulatory action.  Essentially, valid 
government policy options would not be restricted, but would have to be 
independently justified. 
The commercial manager could be part of a separate cross-agency 
organization or be separated by an ethical wall from the part of the agency 
that makes the loan or which regulates the recipient’s industry.  A separate 
organization with the sole purpose of managing government investments in 
a commercially reasonable manner might be superior to an ethical wall 
because of clear demarcation of responsibilities and reporting lines, 
standardization (and predictability) of government behavior, and desirable 
tension and checks between and among government officials.  On the other 
hand, it would be difficult to ensure political independence of a separate 
organization and purported impartiality could be a mere fig leaf, industry 
expertise and experience is likely to be greater within the funding agency, 
and it might be an insurmountable political step for an agency to relinquish 
Companies have repaid Treasury’s investment in full plus $43 billion, FHFA will have the 
Companies pay an additional $153 billion to Treasury over the next decade, and Treasury’s 
liquidation preference will remain unchanged at $189 billion”).
 76.   Ideally, the lead advisory person would be a disinterested government employee or 
consultant with market experience, gravitas, and reputational risk, who could freely 
participate in the deliberative process.  Such a person or group could be very influential, 
much like an independent director who cannot carry a board vote but punches above weight.
94 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:1 
control to an outsider.  There are arguments in favor of and against variants 
of either approach, but the key is that an identified commercial manager 
would set default business terms and conditions.77
The process whereby the government provides or arranges rescue 
financing would have to be flexible enough to allow for emergency funding 
and exigent circumstances.  In practice, over-the-weekend-type bail-outs 
likely would be fully consummated in essentially the same manner as 
today.  However, companies can be in conservatorship, receivership, 
bankruptcy, or teetering distress for extended periods of time, and 
emergency funding often is staged.  To the extent time permits, commercial 
managers could negotiate undefined market terms and conditions, 
implement second-stage transactions, and evaluate requests for 
amendments, waivers, and exits, among other things.  In addition, the 
commercial manager could serve a signaling function, and could receive 
and respond to comments, concerns, and complaints of commercial 
overreach.  This would improve transparency for both investors and 
legislators.  Also, because investor interactions with agencies often are 
highly politicized, both investors and agencies might benefit from a 
deliberately depoliticized, more “technical” method of communication. 
When the government acts only as the lender, the perfect should not 
be made the enemy of the good.  Commercial manager functions and 
independence can and should vary depending on the nature of financial 
assistance.  However, when the government acts on both sides of the rescue 
transaction, it is absolutely critical for market confidence that a truly 
disinterested commercial actor controls negotiations on behalf of the 
recipient entity.  Issues of self-dealing and conflicts of interest are 
 77.   Agencies routinely task a person or group to solicit opinions and gather 
information about the market and commercial reasonableness, and to make 
recommendations to final decision-makers.  Decision-making processes can range from 
real-time, informal deliberations to unhurried and structured presentations at formal 
meetings, even at the same agency.  Accordingly, agencies might offer in response to this 
suggestion that they already differentiate between commercial and regulatory functions 
when appropriate.  Apart from the observation that current practice might be a useful guide 
to determine the manner in which commercial managers would be appointed, there are three 
problems unaddressed by this response.  First, there is a qualitative difference between 
recommendations made to an agency head or board that reserves all decision-making 
authority and recommendations that are self-effectuating unless overruled.  Second, ad hoc
processes tend towards result-oriented analyses and lead to unpredictable signaling to 
investors.  Third, by leaving ambiguity about whether agency actions were regulatory or 
commercial in nature (or both) the agency retains optionality to choose or change 
justifications if challenged.  Agencies presumably want to preserve optionality, like most 
strategic actors, but from an investor and government oversight perspective the ability to 
change rationales after-the-fact undeservedly expands agency discretion.  
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unavoidable when any party, public or private, negotiates both sides of a 
commercial transaction.  The market will not accept that agencies 
ostensibly negotiating against each other truly are adverse, regardless of 
stated agendas or nominal reporting lines.  Nor will the market accept that 
the agency acting as conservator or receiver is immune to political pressure 
and extra-agency control.  Further, even if the conservator or regulator 
walks with the angels, there is no way for investors to assess how the 
agency balanced regulatory concerns and commercial concerns. 
Statutory resolution schemes such as HERA and Dodd-Frank 
expressly provide for government actors to make business decisions 
ordinarily made by private management, directors, and shareholders, with 
limited or no judicial review, and limited or no recourse for perceived 
malfeasance.  Statutory priority schemes and pre-failure government 
guidance may help to mitigate risk, but it is the exercise of agency 
discretion that ultimately drives outcome.  Investors face risk that corporate 
agents cannot or will not protect stakeholder interests and that regulatory or 
political concerns will upend long-standing expectations about recovery, 
timing and process. 
Commercial negotiations between the Federal Housing Finance 
Authority (“FHFA”) and Treasury over how to fund Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are a case in point.  The dispute over the legality and propriety 
of the August 2012 “Net Worth Sweep” turns in large part on whether the 
FHFA acted to preserve and conserve estate assets in its capacity as 
conservator (i.e., commercial conduct) or whether the Net Worth Sweep 
pretextually advanced a regulatory or self-interested government agenda 
though contract.  More simply, would a disinterested conservator motivated 
to preserve estate assets have agreed to the Net Worth Sweep?  Some 
investors perceive that the Net Worth Sweep would have been rejected or 
materially changed had the FHFA negotiated contractual terms as an 
independent and disinterested commercial actor. 
Regardless, from a market perspective, whether the FHFA exceeded 
statutory authority, made arbitrary and capricious decisions, breached 
fiduciary duties, caused breaches of contract, or acquiesced to regulatory 
takings, all are matters that relate to commercial independence and self-
dealing.  Even today, it is hard to see how the FHFA director, wearing both 
a regulatory and commercial hat, impartially could consider proposals to 
preserve or raise capital at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or continue to 
negotiate opposite Treasury.  FHFA appointment of an independent and 
disinterested commercial manager, ethically bound to consider options only 
from estate perspectives, would reduce actual or perceived conflicts of 
interest.  It also would improve transparency and accountability, 
particularly if FHFA’s conflicting role as commercial manager actually 
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were delegated to a third-party operating under clear instructions.  With 
billions of dollars and market confidence at stake, there are strong reasons 
why an agency in effective control of a bail-out recipient should appoint a 
disinterested manager to represent the interests of the estates and 
stakeholders. 
Going forward, it is much more likely the government will participate 
on both sides of a rescue transaction, and that the lines between regulatory 
conduct and commercial conduct will be blurred.  Dodd-Frank emphasizes 
the purpose of receivership as “stability” and furtherance of the public good 
in a way not similarly emphasized in the FDIA or HERA,78 and a receiver 
exercising orderly liquidation authority may argue there is express statutory 
support for a receiver to consider regulatory objectives.  An FDIC rule that 
limits the terms and conditions of funds provided to the covered company 
would be welcomed by investors.  The FDIC also may very well end up 
negotiating rescue financing terms on behalf of subsidiaries not in 
receivership, and guidelines for management of subsidiaries also would be 
welcome.  Finally, there is no reason to believe government intervention 
authorized in as-yet-unwritten legislation would seek to separate 
commercial and regulatory functions, and recent trends imply the opposite. 
It may be that the appointment of a commercial manager would not 
change agency behavior.  Worse, it is possible that endorsement of bail-out 
terms and conditions by a commercial manager would validate agency 
actions even if the manager were not truly disinterested.  On the other hand, 
agency optionality comes at a high cost, diffuse and difficult to quantify in 
the absence of a crisis, and concentrated and pro-cyclically damaging in a 
crisis.  All else equal, disinterested exercise of discretion will lower the 
cost of capital, and interested exercise of discretion will increase the cost of 
capital or render capital unavailable at a useful cost.  Investors and 
ultimately the government would benefit if commercial terms could be set 
in a more predictable, transparent and accountable process, by a 
disinterested actor. 
D. Proposal 4: Reorganization earmarks should be subject to the 
political process 
The likelihood that a private creditor will transfer value for a purpose 
other than its own pecuniary interest is low.  On the other hand, the 
government may have valid policy or political reasons to “earmark” value 
 78.   See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5386 (2010) (stating that “[i]n taking action under this title, 
the Corporation shall (1) determine that such action is necessary for purposes of the 
financial stability of the United States, and not for the purpose of preserving the covered 
financial company”).
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in favor of preferred stakeholders, counterparties, or labor.  Direct transfers 
of value include new money distributions, gifting of recovery, and 
adjustment of recovery accomplished through control over process.  
Indirect transfers of value include company failure to enforce rights, 
purchase of assets at an inflated price, and forced assumption of liabilities, 
among other methods. 
Two of the most troubling bail-outs in the financial crisis were the 
rescues of Chrysler and General Motors.  The most cogent legal objections 
raised in those bankruptcies concerned lightning-quick Section 363 sales of 
all operations to shell corporations, both on procedural grounds and with 
respect to valuation.  Less cognizable, but more easily understood, were 
objections that the government used the bankruptcy process and its 
checkbook to benefit preferred constituencies, namely union employees 
and retirees.  At a minimum, DIP terms forced the purchasing shell 
companies to assume union contract and pension liabilities that some 
argued should be rejected.  There also were allegations that preferred 
creditors received plan distributions in excess of legal entitlement, as a 
consequence of DIP terms.79
Whether the reorganization earmarks in Chrysler and General Motors 
bankruptcy were legal and appropriate is beside the point.  Market 
perception of many was that the reorganization earmarks were not in 
accord with ordinary rules governing priority of recovery and distribution 
to similarly-situated classes of creditors.  That future reorganization 
earmarks, the size and scope of which are beyond the predictive ability of 
investors, similarly would be legally approved or unreviewable is the 
source of market uncertainty and concern. 
A government policy to self-restrict reorganization earmarks would 
add value for investors and address political concerns.80  Banning 
 79.   See Mark J. Roe & Joo-Hee Chung, How the Chrysler Reorganization Differed 
from Prior Practice, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 399, 428 (2013) (discussing the differences 
between the Chrysler reorganization and previous section 363 sales in its benefit to labor 
unions and pension plans over other investors); see also A. Joseph Warburton, 
Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: A Primer, 60 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 531, 548-51 (2010) (explaining that critics of the Section 363 sales in both the 
Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcy proceedings focused on its preference to the 
company’s unions over investors).
 80.   Reorganization earmarks pretextually created through a commercial relationship 
suborn the political process and may lead to outcomes deeply inconsistent with prior 
legislative pronouncements (e.g., preferential payments to pensioners may undercut the 
deliberate congressional mandate to rank pension deficiency claims pari passu and not 
ahead of other general unsecured claims in bankruptcy).  Checks and balances normally at 
play during an appropriations or policy debate are missing, political costs are reduced or 
eliminated, and the administrative decision-making process is not transparent.  Essentially, it 
is difficult or impossible to hold a regulator or administrator specifically accountable for the 
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reorganization earmarks is politically unrealistic and may be unworkable, 
but an internal policy that calls for review of commercial transactions to 
identify, highlight, and justify reorganization earmarks on a policy basis 
would be very valuable.  The jaundiced view is that such a policy would be 
dead-letter because it would be ignored or only superficially followed, and 
would be yet another elevation of form over substance to create the illusion 
of meaningful process.  The more nuanced view is that such a pre-existing 
rule could influence decision-makers, improve predictability, give political 
cover to deny requests for value, and reduce lobbying.  Both investors and 
the body politic would be better served if reorganization earmarks were 
called out as political and not commercial conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Although investors acknowledge the inevitability that government will 
seek to implement policy through deal-making and delegation to agencies, 
they struggle to price the uncertainty this introduces.  There is no way to 
eliminate ad hoc approaches to government intervention as each crisis is 
new, each company is different, and rubrics about whether and why to 
intervene can determine how to price and manage investments once made.  
Nor is it clear that public policy would always be served by rigid adherence 
to pre-existing rules and prior conduct.  Still, rules of general application 
can be constructed in light of noncontroversial goals such as transparency, 
accountability, and predictability.  Incremental steps can be taken to delink 
policy or political objectives from the terms, conditions, and management 
of commercial rescue loans. 
Existing law and practice may lead to suboptimal results with respect 
to non-bank reorganization financings by the government.  Unpredictable 
government use of contractual leverage to accomplish policy or political 
goals plainly upsets investor expectations, creating distortion of capital 
markets and dead-weight losses, and ironically increases the likelihood and 
magnitude of future bail-outs by discouraging private risk-taking by would-
be rescue lenders.  Agencies naturally want to preserve decision-making 
optionality, but failure to acknowledge and separate commercial and 
regulatory agendas also makes it more difficult for the government to 
intervene without creating market distortion, or to distinguish relatively 
public policy decision to confer value because that action is analyzed under the rubric of 
commercial activity.  See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The 
Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468 (2009) (noting 
that “[g]overnment by deal is not open government, and it rejects some of the usual values 
of administrative law, such as predecision notice to affected parties and the public; 
measured, unhasty action; and comment-ventilated policymaking”). 
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inoffensive injections of liquidity from highly distasteful injections of 
capital on account of balance-sheet insolvency. 
From a market perspective it appears that there has been vigorous 
debate and discussion about government intervention up until the moment 
it is decided a check should be cut.  However, there has been insufficient 
focus on agency conflict of interest, transparency and accountability.  
Reorganization loans should be unpleasant to the borrower and its 
stakeholders but terms and management of such loans should be designed 
to encourage private capital formation.  Even when legally permissible, 
regulating under the façade of protecting a pecuniary interest should be 
seen as suspect and potentially counterproductive.  A good approach is to 
self-limit agency discretion to make resolution processes more predictable 
and certain. 
